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Most studies on the role of international actors in peace processes tend to focus on 
mediation and applications of incentives and sanctions. This study deviates from these 
general trends and focuses on how the interests and fears of the international actors affect 
the progress and outcomes of a peace process and subsequently conflict transformation. 
Using post-2001 peace processes in Somalia as the study case, the dissertation notes that 
international actors‟ interventions, particularly in collapsed states, are inspired by concerns 
over the trans-border implications of the conflict, moral imperative or third party 
intervention interests. Thus, mapping the interests of the main international actors who 
were involved in these peace processes and analysing their impact on these peace 
processes‟ outcomes are the core objectives of this study. The central thesis is that 
assessing the impact of these interests on the progress and outcomes of the peace 
processes entails evaluating their effects on the transformation of the Somali actors, their 
relationships, their socio-political and economic institutions and the narratives and 
discourses that premise their interactions and social identities. The key finding of the 
research is that all international actors pledged their commitment to conflict resolution, 
peace and reconstruction in Somalia, but their competing interests and contending 
priorities undermined actor transformation, frustrated relationship transformation, 
hampered re-building of institutions and stymied transformation of conflict narratives. As 
a result, conflict and violence escalated. The dissertation concludes with a brief peace 
studies understanding of the conflict in Somalia, lessons learned from international 
interventions in post-2001 peace processes and some policy recommendations. Among the 
recommendations are harmonisation of regional interests, phased approach to resolution of 
the conflict, reframing of narratives and de-linking of Somali conflict issues from global 
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What can be done to restore trust, hope and resolve the conflict in your country? I first 
posed this question to my friends from Somalia - Hadi Abdi Yusuf, Abdulrahman Roble 
and Hussein Jabiri - in March 2003. I later asked the same question to many Somali 
delegates who were attending the Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference 
(SNPRC) at Mbagathi in Nairobi in 2003 and 2004. I have since then posed the same 
question to Somali leaders and academics that I have met in international forums on 
Somalia. Interestingly, the connecting thread in all responses has been criticism of the role 
of international actors. The criticism is inevitable given that international actors have 
played a central role in Somalia in the last two decades. The important point is the 
difference in viewpoints in exactly how the international interventions have affected the 
peace processes.1 One view argues that the international actors have failed to provide the 
necessary support, particularly financial resources, to the „well-meaning‟ internal actors.2 
Another view blames the international interveners for „spoiling‟ internal peace initiatives 
and for not allowing Somalis the opportunity to resolve their own conflict. In between 
these two are myriad of views, some preferring more engagements by international actors 
and others opting for less engagement.   
 
This dissertation pursues that theme of interventions by international actors in peace 
processes in Somalia. The study will focus on the post-2001 peace processes and will be 
premised on conflict transformation theoretical perspectives. Other theoretical frameworks 
will be incorporated to elaborate the arguments when their role has relevance to the 
discussion. Four important issues will anchor the research. Firstly, international actors 
                                                          
1There is no universally agreed definition of a peace process. A detailed unpacking of the terminology will 
be done in Chapter 4.  
2 This argument was forcefully articulated by the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG), Prof. Abdulrahman Adam Ibrahim „Ibbi‟, during the Conference on the African Union 
Support to the Implementation of the Djibouti Peace Process for Somalia, which took place in Bujumbura, 
Burundi, on 15-18 November 2010. In my discussions with him at the margins of the conference, Prof. Ibbi 
argued that his view represents the official position of the TFG. However, who the well-meaning internal 
actors are is contested. To Prof. Ibbi, well-meaning actors refer to the TFG. Others disagree and refer to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), while gender activists refer to the women constituency.  
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have interests and goals that drive their interventions. The research aim‟s to explore how 
these interests affect the progress and the outcomes of peace interventions. Secondly, the 
nature and scope of international peace interventions in Somalia has changed greatly over 
the last two decades, but the outcomes have not changed. Thirdly, the conflict in Somalia 
is intractable. This means the conflict „has created patterns that have become part of the 
social system‟ (Botes, 2003: 10). Thus, its resolution requires not just a peace agreement, 
but the transformation of the actors, the structures and the narratives that reproduce 
violence. Fourthly, how internal actors view the role of external parties has affected the 
way they (internal actors) relate with each other, and how they link Somalia conflict issues 
to the global discourses. For instance, some Somali parties view external interveners such 
as Ethiopia, the AU, UN and the US positively, while their opponents view these actors 
negatively. Accordingly, those who have a positive view seek to de-legitimise their 
opponents by associating them with international terrorism thus linking Somalia‟s internal 
conflicts with the global discourses on terrorism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and 
Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2007; Ibrahim, 2010; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007, 200b). The 
study will therefore seek to understand the impact of these relationships on the peace 
processes and, ultimately, on conflict transformation.  
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
Interventions by international actors in peace processes that seek to resolve protracted 
intra-state conflicts such as Somalia are premised on three ideas. Firstly, protracted 
conflicts that lead to state collapse destroy internal political, economic, social and cultural 
institutions. International actors are therefore bound by moral imperative to intervene as 
the collapsed states will not emerge from such conflicts on their own (Covey et al, 2005; 
Hehir, 2008; Weinstein, 2005). Secondly, the trans-border consequences of these conflicts 
pose a threat to the regional and international security (Covey et al, 2005; Elliot and 
Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2008; Menkhaus, 2009a; Weinstein, 2005). It is therefore in the 
interest of the international actors to intervene in such conflicts. Thirdly, international 
actors, as third parties, can facilitate resolution of these conflicts (Covey et al, 2005; Darby 




What role do the international actors play in such peace processes? Most studies on this 
topic tend to focus on mediation and applications of instruments such as incentives, 
sanctions and pressures. As a third party intervention into a conflict, mediation is aimed at 
assisting the conflicting parties find their own mutually acceptable settlements (Hampson, 
2005; Kriesberg, 2007; Ramsbotham et al, 2005). Incentives are those measures that seek 
to create favourable conditions for negotiations, encourage progress in peace processes, 
support implementation of peace agreements, and generate wide support for peace 
(Wallensteen, 2007). Sanctions are those measures that threaten and pressure one or all of 
the parties in the conflict to change their positions or behaviour through raising the costs 
of intransigence (Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). Whilst mediators are 
presumed neutral or impartial, both incentives and sanctions target local actors who are 
directly responsible for driving the conflict and have the greatest interests in the outcomes 
of the peace processes (Arnson, 1999; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007).  
 
However, the international actors are hardly neutral when they intervene in peace 
processes. On the contrary, they have interests in how the peace processes are conducted 
and in the overall outcomes. These interests include support of one or the other local 
actors, access to resources and economies, political prestige and security considerations 
(Gambari, 1995; Menkhaus, 2010b, 2002). The key indicators of these interests are the 
priorities the international actors articulate or support in the course of peace processes and 
their post-peace agreement engagements and policies. Yet, how the interests and priorities 
pursued by the international actors affect the outcomes of the peace processes has received 
little academic attention. Using the case of international interventions in post-2001 peace 
processes in Somalia, this study seeks to contribute towards bridging this gap. In 
particular, the study aim‟s to map the interests, fears and priorities of the main 
international actors that were involved in these processes. It then explores how these 
priorities affected the internal actors, components and outcomes of the peace processes 
and, subsequently, conflict transformation in Somalia. The study then sums up the learned 
lessons and concludes with some policy recommendations for the international actors, 






1.3 Objectives and relevance of the study 
 
Since January 1991, when the state of Somalia collapsed, the country has been without a 
functioning central government, a formal economy, or an effective peace agreement. The 
central-southern regions of the country are still in partial anarchy, the north-east districts 
became a semi-autonomous region known as Puntland in 1998, while the north-west 
region seceded in August 1991 to form the unrecognised Republic of Somaliland. More 
than fifteen internationally supported peace processes have been held since 1991. None 
has succeeded. Instead, all have been followed by escalation of violence. Thus, the 






The overall objective of this study will be to explore why all of the post-2001 international 





The specific objectives of the study are: -  
 
1) To map the interests, fears and priorities of the international peace interveners in 
post-2001 Somalia; 
2) To explore how the interests, fears and priorities of the international peace 
interveners affected or influenced the outcomes of the post-2001 peace processes; 
and 







1.3.2 Relevance of the study 
 
Several reasons justify this study. Firstly, there is robust literature on the essential 
components of peace processes and the conditions under which they succeed or fail 
(Covey et al, 2005; Darby, 2001; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Hampson, 2005; Zartman, 
1995). These conditions include interventions by third parties, the terms of peace 
agreement and the regional and global context. However, how exactly the interests and 
fears of international interveners affect the outcomes of the peace processes has received 
little academic attention. Moreover, peace and conflict scholars argue that intra-state 
conflicts start when the political system fails to address particular grievances (Arnson, 
1999; Darby, 2001; Wallensteen, 2007). Therefore, a key aim of a peace process is to 
establish mechanisms that shift the conflict from violence to the political arena (Arnson, 
1999; Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003). Central to that shift is the 
transformation of actors and the structure of interaction. This study is therefore relevant as 
it aims to contribute towards an understanding of how the interests of international actors 
have affected the transformation of the internal actors and the social structures in Somalia.        
 
Secondly, all the peace processes that have been initiated by international actors in 
Somalia have been followed by escalation of violence. While academic studies on how the 
internal actors use violence to derail peace processes exist (Darby, 2001; Stedman, 2003, 
1997; Zahar, 2003), there is very little academic research on the linkage between the 
interests and priorities of international peace interveners and violence escalation. This 
study is relevant for it seeks to bridge that gap by exploring the co-relation between the 
priorities pursued by international actors, peace processes and the outcomes. Additionally, 
the study seeks to understand how that co-relation can create hindrances or potential 
opportunities for transformation of the protracted conflict in Somalia.    
 
Thirdly, international actors have spent huge amount of resources, in terms of money, time 
and diplomacy for the purpose of resolving the conflict in Somalia. As Kaplan (2010: 81) 
avers, the international community has since 1991 „launched at least fourteen peace 
initiatives in Somalia and spent more than US$8 billion on efforts to create a strong state.‟ 
These huge resources have failed to transform the conflict. The study will therefore 
contribute towards a better understanding of how the AU, the UN and other international 
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actors can best implement peacemaking initiatives not just in Somalia, but also in other 
countries where states have collapsed. Hence, it will conclude with some policy options 
for international actors that are implementing conflict resolution interventions in Somalia.   
 
Lastly, the conflict in Somalia presents a regional, continental and global challenge. An 
internationalised intra-state conflict, Somalia is currently one of the world‟s worst 
humanitarian crises (Hesse, 2010; Menkhaus, 2010a). In 2010 alone, more than 200,000 
people were displaced within Somalia while another 70 000 fled to neighbouring countries 
adding to the estimated 2.2 million who remained displaced at the end of 2009 (UNHCR, 
2011). Somalia also has an estimated diaspora of one million people, the world‟s biggest 
(Healy and Sheikh, 2009). In addition, international actors have been concerned that 
stateless Somalia has become a haven for international terrorists (Barnes and Hassan, 
2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007, 2002a, 2002b; Samatar, 
2010; Verhoeven, 2009). That has been worsened by the problem of piracy along the coast 
of Somalia (Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009b; Pham, 2010). This study is therefore 
significant as it will add to the existing scholarship on conceptual and theoretical 
understanding of the international dimension of the conflict in Somalia.   
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
This study will be exploratory in nature. Its research methodology will therefore be a 
systematic analysis of key texts and policy documents. The primary sources that will be 
analysed are the official policy documents and resolutions of the important international 
actors. These include UN Security Council (UNSC), the African Union Peace and Security 
Council (AUPSC), the African Union Commission (AUC), the Inter-government 
Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of the Arab States (LAS), European 
Union (EU) and the Horn of Africa countries. Other documents to be reviewed include 
letters and media statements of the relevant international actors.  Peace agreements, 
Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), official documents of the TFG and media statements 
of other armed groups will also be analysed.  
 
The secondary sources of data that will be reviewed are news reports, media statements, 
peace processes‟ evaluation reports, scholarly and academic analyses as well as books, 
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articles and papers by Somali studies‟ experts. The review of secondary data will not only 
assist in mapping the interests and priorities of the international actors, but it will also 
provide a sound understanding of the issues and discourses on the subject of research. 
Additionally, it will deepen the understanding of the links between theoretical thinking on 
conflict transformation and practical issues in Somalia.  In sum, the strength of qualitative 
textual analysis lies in its ability to allow for the presentation of a wide range of views on 
the issues of research and making of logical deductions.  
 
These deductions will be supplemented by my own engagements with discourses on 
Somalia, and interactions with some Somali faction leaders. They will also be 
supplemented by my engagements with the officials of the African Union Mission for 
Somalia (AMISOM), and discussions with the staff of the United Nations Political Office 
for Somalia (UNPOS). For ease of data analysis, the literature will be grouped into five 
categories: (a) peace processes, (b) causes of conflicts, state collapse and conflict 
sustenance, (c) conflict intractability, (d) humanitarian interventions, and (e) Islamism, 
terrorism and piracy. The research approach will be to analyse empirical findings using the 




There are some limitations related to this research. Though every effort will be made to 
read as widely as possible, it is worth noting that academic works on the conflict in 
Somalia are dominated by non-Somali scholars from Western Europe and North America 
such as I. M. Lewis and Ken Menkhaus. The scholarship in most of their works is of high 
quality; nonetheless, no social scientist is absolutely neutral. These academic works 
therefore have elements of their authors‟ Western bias. Additionally, their conceptual 
approach to the resolution of the conflict in Somalia is informed by the international 
actor‟s efforts to re-create the Somali state and the global discourses on terrorism. Thus, 
they tend to overemphasise the role of internal actors and to downplay the effect of 
international actors on peace processes. Indeed, some Somali scholars such as Abdullahi 
Osman, Ali Jimale, Ismail Samatar and Said Samatar have written extensively on the 
conflict, but their work focuses on the causes of the conflict and state collapse. Some of 
them, as Ali (1995) has argued, have adopted the perspectives and approaches of the 
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international actors towards Somalia. This has left a gap in the analyses of peace processes 
and the role of international actors. To a large extent, therefore, this study will be entering 
an under-researched area. Lastly, conducting field work in Somalia is very difficult due to 
violent lawlessness. Even international actors such as AMISOM, UNPOS, UN agencies 
and all the international humanitarian organisations that work in Somalia have their offices 
in Nairobi, Kenya.  
           
1.6 Dissertation structure 
 
The dissertation is structured into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the study, the 
research problem, the objectives of the research and explains the research methodology. 
Chapter two will review the literature and then explores the various theoretical 
frameworks that have been employed in the analysis. The literature is categorised into five 
subsets, while the frameworks that are reviewed are the interest based negotiation and 
conflict transformation theories. Chapter three and four will provide the context of the 
conflict and the main international peace processes respectively.  
 
Chapter five and six captures the central thesis of the study. Chapter five will map the 
interests, fears, and priorities of international actors and analyse their competitions in the 
post-2001 peace processes. Chapter six will then analyse in details how these interests and 
fears have affected the outcomes of peace processes. Important highlights in the analysis 
in chapters five and six include the argument that state-building and conflict resolution as 
desired outcomes of the peace processes have been complementary, but the competing 
interests and priorities of the international actors have undermined transformation of the 
Somali actors. As a result, the processes have produced conflicting outcomes which have 
in turn led to escalation of violence. This argument leads to identification of the learned 









Chapter 2   




The protracted conflict in Somalia has been a subject of popular and academic discourses. 
While the popular discourses have narrated the conflict in stereotypical terms of anarchy, 
most academic discourses have been premised on anthropological, historical, political 
science and international relations perspectives. Therefore, there are very few analyses of 
the conflict that have utilised theories of peace studies. In addition, academic writings on 
the causes and consequences of the state collapse are abundant. Considerable academic 
attention has also been devoted to themes such as Islamism and terrorism. However, 
literature on international interventions in Somalia‟s peace processes is limited. Yet, 
Somalia has witnessed more than fifteen internationally supported peace processes since 
1991.  
 
This implies that the dynamics of the peace processes, including the impact of 
international interests, have not been adequately covered. The first aim of this chapter 
therefore is to review the existing literature in order to survey the accumulated scholarship 
on peace processes in Somalia. The review will also survey how scholars of Somali 
studies have framed their arguments and conceptualised peace interventions. For ease of 
analysis, the literature will be divided into five sets: peace processes, causes of conflict 
and state collapse, conflict intractability, humanitarian interventions and Islamism, 
terrorism and piracy. This chapter also aims to present the peace studies theoretical 
approaches that will be employed in this dissertation.  
 
All the major Somali peace processes, including the 2002-2004 Somalia National Peace 
and Reconciliation Conference (SNPRC) and the 2008 Djibouti IV process, were initiated 
by international actors. International actors initiate peace processes in order to end 
violence and to create institutions that would discourage internal parties from resorting to 
arms (Darby and Ginty, 2003). These two goals of international peace interventions are 
founded on the understanding that violent conflicts occurs within a structure of interaction 
that can be transformed (Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003). This makes the 
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interest-based and conflict transformation theories very relevant to this study. The interest-
based theory is concerned with interests underpinning incompatibilities, while the conflict 
transformation theory is concerned with the change of actors, their structure of interaction 
and their cultural context (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 
2000). Thus, the chapter will highlight the key postulates of both theories.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
There exists a good amount of academic studies on different themes around the protracted 
conflict in Somalia. However, there are very few texts that are devoted to international 
interventions in the country‟s peace processes. Previous research on this topic is thus 
found in five different sets of literature.  
 
2.2.1 Peace processes 
 
The first set is concerned with the dynamics of the peace processes. Four main arguments 
are found in this literature. The first argument emphasises components of a peacemaking 
process such as representation, legitimacy, inclusion and exclusion. In an analysis of the 
2008 Djibouti IV peace process, Kasaija (2010) argues that the process failed because it 
excluded important actors who resorted to violence. The author also argues that previous 
processes including the 2000 Djibouti III process and the Nairobi process failed because of 
limited inclusivity. Other authors such as Hansen (2003), Healy (2011), and Menkhaus 
(2010b, 2002b) have emphasised exclusion as a cause of failure of the peace processes. 
Woodward (2004) has, however, offered a contrary argument stating that the peace 
process in Kenya failed due to open ended inclusion. Noting that 1000 delegates arrived in 
Eldoret for the talks instead of the 300 expected by the Technical Committee on behalf of 
IGAD, he adds that the delegates arrived and went continually. He has also averred that 
the issue of the numbers raised questions about representation and motives for 
participation, something that led many analysts to observe that the numbers were about 
expectations of potential spoils. Schlee (2010) has also articulated the same viewpoint 
about the issue of numbers and representation in the process in Kenya. Nonetheless, these 




The centrality of internal actors is also emphasised in the second argument which is 
premised on the spoiler discourses. Such discourses refer to spoilers as „leaders and parties 
who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview and 
interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it‟ (Stedman, 1997: 5). 
Spoilers are thus groups, factions or individuals who use violence to undermine peace 
processes or implementation of peace agreements. Menkhaus (2006) has argued that an 
array of spoilers exists in Somalia. These spoilers not only undermined peace processes to 
perpetuate an armed conflict, but also hampered efforts to revive an effective central 
government and derailed efforts to improve law and order. The spoilers fall into two 
categories. Category one comprises of situational spoilers. These are clans or factions who 
feel unrepresented in institutions emerging from peace processes. Category two comprises 
of perpetual spoilers who dread the return of state institutions and the rule of law. These 
include warlords3 who benefit from the war economy, some business people engaged in 
illicit trade, and clans that have occupied other people‟s valuable rural lands and urban 
properties. Other authors such as Kasaija (2010) and Ibrahim (2010) have included 
Islamists in the list of spoilers. The Islamists are presumed to be motivated by religious 
extremism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Hansen, 2003; Ibrahim, 2010).  
 
The third argument stresses the absence of the necessary conditions for conflict resolution, 
inappropriate timing of peace interventions and missed opportunities by international 
actors (Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007, 2006, 2003a; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000; Woodward, 
2004). Conditions necessary for conflict resolution include parties‟ willingness to 
negotiate, ripe moments, mutually enticing opportunities, mutually hurting stalemates, 
appropriate turning points and external context (Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000; 
Zartman, 2003). In Somalia three factors, the external context, parties‟ willingness to 
resolve the conflict and timing of interventions, have been critical. Menkhaus (2009a, 
2007, 2006, 2003a) observes that the external context has not been favourable to the 
resolution of the conflict, while Somali leaders have undermined peacemaking processes 
in their quest for power. He also notes that a collective fear of the return of a centralised 
                                                          
3 Kimberley Marten (2006: 48) has offered four characteristics of warlords: First, trained, armed men take 
advantage of the disintegration of central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory.  
Second, their actions are based on self-interest, not ideology. Third, their authority is based on charisma and 
patronage ties to their followers. Four, this personalistic rule leads to the fragmentation of political and 
economic arrangements across the country, disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and 
investment unpredictable.  
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state pervades in the country and international interveners have missed the right 
opportunities. Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000: 212) adds that one explanation for failure is 
that „the Somali conflict has simply not been ripe for resolution; that is, the protagonists to 
the dispute have not reached a “hurting stalemate” and are thus not amenable to outside 
mediation.‟ Woodward (2004: 473-474) also raises the point of timing and ripeness in a 
comparative analysis between Sudan and Somalia where he argues that „Sudan looked 
more ripe for resolution [while] Somalia looked more difficult‟. The central point of this 
argument touches the heart of this study because external context includes the priorities 
and interests of international actors.  
 
The point also links us to the fourth argument, which focuses on the behaviour of external 
actors. Schlee (2010) has stressed that each IGAD frontline state and other international 
players had their preferences among the Somali factions participating in the Nairobi 
process.  Thus, each wanted to increase the representation of their preferred faction at the 
expense of the others. Ibrahim (2010: 284) also advances the same argument noting that 
the 1996-97 Sodere (in Ethiopia) conference „strengthened Ethiopia‟s role in Somali 
affairs, while Egypt organised a rival peace process in Cairo in an effort to undermine the 
Sodere process.‟ And while Osman (2005) has discussed in details the effects of 
competition between Ethiopia and Egypt, other authors such as Bamfo (2010), Cliffe 
(1999), Gresse-Kettler (2004), Menkhaus (2010b, 2009) and Raffaelli (2007) have briefly 
mentioned external actors‟ support to rival factions. Additionally, Menkhaus and 
Ortmayer (2000) and Samatar (2010) have critiqued international actors such as the UN 
and US for legitimising the warlords.  
 
Arguments three and four raise important questions: how can external interveners create 
the necessary conditions for conflict resolution? Can the behaviour of the external actors 
be classified as spoiling? What can be done about external situational and perpetual 
spoilers? Understanding how the interests and fears of the international actors have 







2.2.2 Causes of conflict and state collapse  
 
The second genre of literature, which deals with the causes of the conflict and state 
collapse, is the most robust and abundant. The robustness is represented by heated debates 
between three competing interpretations.4 The first one, the primordial interpretation, is 
the most pervasive in popular and academic discourses. The interpretation portrays the 
Somali society as ethnically homogenous but one that is divided into kinship units based 
on segmentary lineage system (Hesse, 2010; Kusov, 1995; Lewis, 2008, 2004, 1998, 1972; 
Samater, 1992).  Samatar (1992) attributes the prevalence of primordial thinking to 
Anthropologist I.M. Lewis‟s dominance of Somali studies. Lewis 1950s seminal work on 
Somalia concluded that „the Somalis have a highly equalitarian society with pastoralism as 
a base [and] the fundamental organising principle of their way of life is segmentary 
clanism‟ (Samatar, 1992: 627). Lewis has re-emphasised the primacy of the clan system in 
Somali society and its role in competition for resources, political power and personal 
security in subsequent works. Thus, according to the primordial view, the conflict arose 
and the state collapsed because the clan system is inherently against modern state-building 
(Hesse, 2010; Lewis, 2008, 2004, 1998, 1993). As Prunier (1997, cited in Hesse, 2010: 
250) writes, the „very idea of the state is totally alien to Somali culture and was unknown 
before the colonial period….‟ In short, the primordialists view the conflict as rooted in 
traditional clan rivalries. In primordial thinking, therefore, participation in peace processes 
and subsequent state institutions has to reflect clan representation. The primordialists most 
important contribution to all peace processes is the 4.5 formula.5 One weakness with the 
primordial thinking is that it downplays the role of external actors in the peace processes. 
It therefore does not address how their interests and fears have affected these processes.  
 
                                                          
4 The terms primordial, instrumental and construction comes from Peter J Schraeder‟s (2006: 108-110) 
analysis of the pan-Somali nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s. Other analysts have used different 
approaches. Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992: 626-631) has employed „two theses‟, that is, the traditionalist and 
the transformationist. Abdullah A. Mohamoud (2006:20) has employed Samatar‟s approaches, but he calls 
them „two rival academic traditions‟. Abdulahi A. Osman (2007:97) has used two schools, heterogeneous 
and homogenous. I have elaborated these approaches and my usage of the three terms in chapter 7 where I 
develop a peace studies understanding of the conflicts in Somalia.     
5 The 4.5 formula was first proposed at the Sodere peace conference of 1996. It was later adopted at the 2000 
Djibouti peace conference and the2002- 2004 Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference 
(SNPRC) that took place in Nairobi. 4.5 means representation in parliament is evenly divided amongst four 
main clans, the Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Digle-Mirifle, while the minority constituencies get 50% of the 
share allocated to each of these four. Details of this formula are explained in Chapter 4.  
14 
 
The second interpretation, the instrumentalism, critiques the primordial thinking and 
attributes the causes of the conflicts to bad governance and leaders who mobilised clan 
identities (Menkhaus, 2002b; Osman, 2007; Samatar, 1992). Asserting that the „culprit is 
not kinship,‟ Samatar (1992: 638-639) has critiqued the clan analysis as pandering to „elite 
opportunism and Eurocentric racism‟. He has also faulted the elite for collectively 
instrumentalising clanship in their political competition over the control of the state which 
was the most lucrative source of wealth accumulation. Samatar (1992) further argues that 
the instrumentalisation of the clan heritage acquired deadly dimensions during the reign of 
President Siyaad Barre, particularly after the defeat of Somalia in the 1977 Ogaadeen war.  
Osman (2007: 104) takes this argument further pointing out that General Barre‟s first 
cabinet of 1969 „consisted of 14 ministers of which 7 (or 50%) were held by members of 
Barre‟s Darood clan up from 32% in the government of the late Abdulrashid Sharmaarke‟s 
(1967-1969).‟ The instrumental thinking therefore faults the international actors for 
legitimising the faction leaders (including warlords) in the peace processes. In other 
words, the instrumentalists question the linkage between some internal actors and the 
interests and fears of external actors.  
 
The third interpretation also critiques the primordialists. Articulated by scholars such as 
Catherine Besteman (1999a, 1999b, 1996a, 1996b, 1995), Lee Cassanelli (1996, cited in 
Schlee, 2008) and Christian Webersik (2004), the construction interpretation argues that 
the war that led to state collapse was rooted in social stratification, inequality and political, 
economic and social exclusion. In a critique of the popular media‟s depiction of the post-
1991 violence, Besteman (1996a:123 -124) argues that  the „cleavages in Somali society 
not only derive from clan but, more critically, draw upon shifting cultural constructions of 
difference such as race, language and status, and economic divisions such as occupation 
and class.‟ Consequently, the patterns of post-1991 violence, most of which occurred in 
the Jubba Valley, were determined by the cultural construction of identity.  Furthering the 
same argument, Webersik (2004: 516) writes that the collapse of the state „can be 
explained by the unjust distribution of new sources of wealth in post-colonial Somalia 
rather than by existing internal divisions based on the ideology of kinship.‟ Other authors 
such as Osman (2007) have argued along the same lines. Thus, the constructionists 
implicitly critique the peace processes for entrenching primordial notions, and for failing 
to address issues of identity formation and transformation of social structures. This 
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argument about transformation of social institutions raises two questions that resonate with 
the core objective of this dissertation. Have peace processes transformed social structures? 
What has been the role of international interveners in that transformation?  
 
In sum, the literature on the causes of conflict and state collapse assists us identify gaps in 
research. It also confirms that the international actors‟ interpretations of the conflicts in 
Somalia have informed their interventions. However, the literature does not 
comprehensively address how the interests and fears of international interveners have 
affected peace processes.   
 
2.2.3 Conflict intractability 
 
Some authors have implicitly addressed the question of intractability of the conflict in 
Somalia in their writings. An intractable conflict (also referred to as protracted or deep-
rooted) is „one that is unusually difficult but not impossible to manage or resolve‟ 
(Crocker et al, 2004: 3). A conflict becomes intractable when political, social and 
economic exclusion and marginalisation converges with group identities (Crocker et al, 
2004; Webersik, 2004). Indicators of intractability include long duration of conflict, deep 
sense of grievances, bitter feelings of enmity, cycles of destructive violence, and many 
failed peacemaking interventions (Crocker et al, 2004).  
 
The literature on conflict intractability advances four arguments (Besteman, 1996a, 1996b; 
Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hesse, 2010; Menkhaus, 2010b, 2003a). First, many Somalis use 
the clan discourse to explain their conflict because the state under President Mohamed 
Siyaad Barre dispensed patronage and punishments in clan terms. As Besteman 
(1996a:126) writes, Barre‟s „distribution of rewards and punishments increasingly came to 
be perceived in clan terms, encouraging a public awareness of and commentary on the clan 
basis of his rule.‟ Second, the shock of state collapse led many Somalis to seek refuge in 
„social networks with great emotional bonds – ties of kinship‟ (Besteman, 1996a: 128). 
Third, the sentiment of the clan has been used in post-1991 Somalia to rally support. A lot 
of violence has thus been between groups organised around clan lines. As Menkhaus 
(2003a:412) writes, an important feature of the „armed conflict since 1992 has been the 
continuing devolution of warfare to lower and lower levels of clan lineages.‟ Fourth, the 
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clan idiom „obscures the fact that rural Southerners had been excluded from national 
politics and policies on the basis of notions of race, ancestry (pure and impure), and status 
– aspects of identity that are inadequately captured in the rubric of clan alone‟ (Besteman, 
1996a: 128). 
 
The intractability dimension is vital to this study because one pillar of conflict 
transformation is changing of the narratives that reproduce violence. These narratives in 
Somalia, as Besteman (1996a: 124) has observed, include those of „class, occupation, race, 
status and language.‟ Hence, the literature helps us understand how the interests of 
international actors have or have not influenced discourse transformation in Somalia. 
 
2.2.4 International humanitarian interventions 
 
The fourth set of literature, which focuses on humanitarian interventions, falls into two 
categories. The first category focuses on the humanitarian interventions of the early 1990s. 
These interventions include the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II. The 
collapse of the state in January 1991 was followed by unparalleled violence, massive 
displacements and widespread famine. The international actors then sought to mediate a 
ceasefire and distribute humanitarian relief. Thus, some authors dwell on the ceasefire 
mediation efforts (Cliffe, 1999; Menkhaus, 2002a; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). 
Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000) have for instance observed that the early 1990s 
international efforts to mediate peace failed because the international actors attempted to 
marginalise some factional leaders and the UN failed to maintain neutrality in the conflict. 
Cliffe (1999: 109) concurs with this argument pointing out that the international actors 
„did not deal even-handedly with all the warlords, choosing at one stage to target Aideed‟s 
faction; but they thereby further marginalised elders, women groups, intellectuals and 
others who wanted to promote peace, and could have emerged as an alternative 
leadership.‟   
 
Other authors have focused on the successes and failures of international humanitarian 
relief particularly UNOSOM I and II (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Diehl, 1996; Menkhaus, 
2010a; Sahnoun, 1994). According to Diehl (1996: 154), UNOSOM was a peacekeeping 
operation that was „specifically designed for the relief and protection of an indigenous 
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population threatened by civil anarchy, inadequate food supplies and the lack of medical 
care.‟  Among the key lessons drawn from the UNOSOM experience were that traditional 
peacekeeping forces do not do peace enforcement jobs, and peacekeeping „does not 
always translate into conflict resolution‟ (Diehl, 1996: 165). Ahmed and Green (1999) and 
Sahnoun (1994) articulated the same point adding that despite UNOSOM‟s successes in 
relief distribution, the mission failed the conflict resolution test when it entered into a war 
with one of the factions leading to deaths of innocent civilians.    
 
Clearly, both groups of authors provide a useful background data on international 
interventions. However, they lack a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between 
interests of the international interveners and the peace processes.   
 
The second category of literature deals with post-2001 interventions. After UNOSOM II 
withdrew in 1995, international actors showed little interest in Somalia. Humanitarian 
efforts were therefore led by local Islamic groups. However, the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 revived international interest in the country as collapsed states were 
identified as causal variables in the global terrorism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and 
Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2008; Ibrahim, 2010; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 2003b, 2002b). 
Post-2001 literature on humanitarian interventions therefore explores the tensions between 
humanitarian relief and military interventions by international actors leading the war on 
terror. As Menkhaus (2010a: 320) avers, „throughout Somalia‟s 20-year crisis, the 
relationship between ongoing, routinized emergency relief operations and episodic but 
intense stabilisation interventions has been contentious.‟  Menkhaus (2010a, 2009) adds 
that the tensions have worsened since 2007 due to many factors among them unilateral 
Ethiopian and multilateral AU military interventions, a ferocious insurgency and counter-
insurgency campaigns, presence of al-Qaeda militants, US counter-terrorism activities, 
and the emergence of piracy. As a consequence, Somalia has become the most dangerous 
place in the world for humanitarian relief agency personnel. Though it focuses on 
humanitarian interventions this literature highlights a key concern of this dissertation: the 






2.2.5 Islamism, terrorism and piracy 
  
The fifth set of literature is divided between those who have written on Islamism and 
terrorism, and those who have analysed piracy. Most analyses on terrorism are premised 
on the notion that stateless Somalia is a likely base of Islamic extremists and/or terrorists. 
However, there are variations in perspectives and emphasis. Some authors take it as given 
that Somalia is a base of international terrorists and that Somali Islamists are part of the 
international terror networks. Pham (2010: 325) has for instance asserted that Somalia 
poses a threat to international peace and security because „the al-Qaeda linked militant 
Islamists of the Harakat al-Shaabab al-Mujahideen‟ have transnational ambitions of 
setting a „fundamentalist state in the Horn of Africa‟. Murphy (2010: 90) also makes 
similar assertions stating that the rise of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) to 
power „stirred fear of regional instability and the possible expansion of terrorist safe 
havens, which forced the United States, however reluctantly, to back Ethiopia in its own 
intervention….‟ To Kaplan (2010: 81), lawlessness, an Islamist insurgency that is linked 
to al-Qaeda, burgeoning anti-Western sentiments and piracy are indicators that Somalia 
has become a haven for terrorists. Bryden (2010) concurs adding that terrorism exists in 
Somalia but it has shallow roots and its focus is local rather than international. Ibrahim 
(2010) similarly asserts the presence of international terrorists in Somalia but roots for a 
cautious approach to the problem.  
 
Other authors have focused on the conditions that led to the emergence of Islamic groups. 
In particular, Menkhaus (2009b, 2007, 2002a, 2002b) has dealt with this question 
extensively tracing the emergence of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and other Islamic 
charities in the 1990s and the rise of Sharia courts. He has also analysed the merger of the 
local Sharia courts to the umbrella body SCIC, the rise of the SCIC to power in 2006, and 
its military defeat by Ethiopia in January 2007. Menkhaus (2007) concludes that the SCIC 
fell because the extremist wing of the Islamists won control of the movement. Submitting 
a similar argument, Barnes and Hassan (2007) observe that the SCIC was a popular 
response to state collapse and its main goals were to provide judicial services, restore law 
and order and provide security. However, the extremist wing won control as the movement 
captured territory and made efforts to recreate the Somali state. The rise of extremists 
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alarmed Ethiopia; it therefore intervened militarily in December 2006 and ousted the SCIC 
from power.  
 
The third group of scholars has vigorously critiqued claims that link Somalia with Islamic 
extremism and international terrorism. Machal (2007) has argued that Islamism and 
extremism are not the same. On the contrary, „religion is, in the great majority of cases, a 
secondary factor behind political grievances and nationalism: the religious discourse used 
by these actors is more instrumental than causative‟ (Machal, 2007: 1101). He has also 
argued that one cannot link local Somali extremism with international Jihadism without 
hard evidence. Making similar arguments, Elliot and Holzer (2009: 226) state that 
„transnational terrorism may be a concern for policymakers in Washington but it has never 
been a significant entity in Somalia.‟ They add that Somalia‟s social environment, 
particularly the clan lineage, hampers growth of international terrorism in the country. 
They conclude their argument with two points. One, the assertions that link Somali 
Islamists with international terrorism are no more than a fallacy, which is informed more 
by external interests and perceptions. In Machal‟s (2007: 1106) words, „the identification 
of the Islamic Courts with Islamic extremism and terrorists gave legitimacy to the US–
Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.‟ Two, the linkage is a reflection of the 
instrumentalisation of the war on terror by both internal and external actors. Hehir (2008) 
does not specifically focus on Somalia, but his broad critique of the linkage between 
collapsed (or failed) states and international terrorism ends with the same observations.  
Focusing on Islamism and terrorism in Somalia, the three groups of authors have raised 
important questions around international actors‟ perceptions and their influence on 
interventions in peace processes. This study will further explore these questions. 
 
On the issue of piracy, some authors have emphasised the criminal and security 
dimensions (Menkhaus, 2009b; Murphy, 2010; Pham, 2010; Samatar, 2010). Others have 
been more concerned with the causes (Khalid, 2010; Kisiangani, 2010). Two important 
causes have been mentioned. The first one is the offshore disorder and statelessness. As 
Khalid (2010: 13) avers, „it is not just a question of lack of enforcement at sea but of 
disorder on land and the growth of land-based networks and infrastructures in Somalia and 
certain socioeconomic factors which create a conducive environment for piracy to foment 
and thrive.‟ The second cause is Somali‟s reaction to illegal fishing and dumping of toxic 
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waste in Somali waters by international actors. As Kisiangani writes (2010: 362), former 
„fishermen, in an attempt to protect the country‟s waters and resources from flotillas of 
external gunboats, or at least wage a campaign to “tax” them, started patrolling the Somali 
waters and engaging in sporadic attacks on foreign vessels.‟ In brief, this genre mainly 
focuses on piracy, but it mentions a central concern of this dissertation: the external 
perception of the conflict in Somalia and their influence on peace interventions.  
 
2.3 Theoretical foundations 
 
This study will primarily employ two theories: the interest-based (or principled) 
negotiation theory and the theory of conflict transformation. The conceptual foundation of 
the two theories is Galtung‟s model of conflict and violence.    
 
2.3.1 Conflict and violence 
 
Conflict and violence are closely related, but they are not synonymous. A conflict is 
conceptualised as incompatibility of interests and needs between two or more parties 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007).The incompatibility may be over material 
and non-material things. These include geographical territory; money or food; political 
power; cultural, political or religious identities; social status, dignity and values. A conflict 
occurs in a particular context and involves attitudes, behaviour and contradictions 
(Galtung, 1996; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). Contradictions are the 
perceived or actual incompatibilities while attitudes refer to parties‟ perception of each 
other. As Ramsbotham et al (2005: 10) writes, „attitude includes emotive (feelings), 
cognitive (belief), and conative (will elements). That is, a conflict arises when negative 
attitudes and behaviour encounter contradiction. A conflict is thus a „dynamic process in 
which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one 
another‟ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:10). In short, this Galtung model conceptualises conflict 














Attitude     Contradiction 
Figure 2.1: Galtung’s conflict triangle 
Violence on the other hand refers to injuring of others in the pursuit of one‟s interest. The 
Galtung model has identified three types of violence: direct, structural and cultural 
violence (Galtung, 1996; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). Direct violence 
refers to physical or psychological injury to an actor. It is a specific event with an 
identifiable perpetrator and victim. Structural violence, in contrast, is related to the 
existence of structures, institutions or policies that prevent people from satisfying their 
basic needs. Structural violence is not visible in specific events; its effects are apparent at 
the societal level. Cultural violence refers to the social, cultural and political rationales that 









Cultural violence   Structural violence 
Figure 2.2: Galtung’s violence triangle 
 
The causal relationship between conflict and violence means their elements are related. 
While direct violence co-relates with behaviour, structural violence co-relates with 












Attitude     Contradiction 
 
 
Cultural violence       Structural violence   
 
Figure 2.3: Linking conflict and violence triangles 
  
The Galtung‟s model forms the conceptual foundation of the two theories utilised by this 
study. Hence, exploring effect of international actors means assessing the extent to which 
international actors have affected direct, structural and cultural violence.  
 
2.3.2 Interest-based (or principled) negotiation theory 
 
Negotiation is a central component of peace processes. Every activity in a peace process 
from ceasefire a greements, to venue a nd ti me determination, to agreements on 
participation a nd subst antive iss ues involves negotiations. Similarly, im plementation of 
peace agreements and post-agreement policy options involve negotiations. Most literature 
on ne gotiations in peace pr ocesses focuses on two theor etical approaches. The fir st 
approach is positional (or dist ributive) bargaining, whic h pr emises negotiations on the 
notion of  bargaining a range of actors‟ positions (Fisher and Ury, 1983, cited in Ross, 
2000).  P ositional bargaining prioritises immediate substantive gains as the aim is to win 
as much as possible in a  c ompetitive bargaining pr ocess. It is characterised b y 
confrontation, hostile tac tics, rigidly-held positions, a nd ends in win-lose outcome s and 
damaged r elationships (Fisher a nd U ry, 1983, c ited in Ross, 2000). T hus, the second 
approach, int erest-based (or  int egrative) ba rgaining, se eks to improve on posi tional 
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bargaining.  Interest-based bargaining premises negotiations on the parties underlying 
interests. The theory has four core postulates: „focus on interests, not positions; separate 
the people from the problem;  generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to 
do; and insist that the result be based on some objective standard‟ (Fisher and Ury, 1983, 
cited in Ross, 2000: 1011). At the heart of the theory, as Ross (2000:1011) explains, is the 
understanding that „once each side can articulate its core interests and understands those of 
the other parties, a creative solution to bridging differences can be generated.‟  
 
This thinking, particularly the notion of focusing on the interests that underpin seemingly 
incompatible positions forms the foundation of the first objective of this study.  As a 
conflict is conceptualised as incompatibility of interests, then transforming it, according to 
the theory, means addressing those interests. The notion of interests in the theory implies 
the interests of the primary actors. However, this study extends it to include secondary and 
tertiary actors. In Somalia, the external actors, who have been initiating the peace 
processes, are secondary and tertiary actors. They therefore have interests and fears that 
drive their interventions. While the interests and fears of the internal actors are overtly 
articulated as they are the principal protagonists, the interests of the international actors 
are not explicit. This problem is complicated by the intractability of the conflict. The 
interest-based theory addresses the intractability problem through its goal of „getting the 
parties to recognise how their relationship is entangled with substantive issues so that the 
two can be separated‟ (Ross, 2000: 1012). In sum, the profound insight from the interest-
based theory is that understanding the interests that drive international actors‟ intervention 
in Somalia is the key to understanding their impact on peace processes. The insight links 
logically with the greed-grievance theories which scholars have used to analyse the 
phenomenon of warlordism that has been rampant in post-1991 Somalia.  
 
2.3.3 Conflict transformation theory 
 
Ross (2000:1020) has referred to conflict transformation as „an alternative approach‟ that 
is premised on the idea that „building sustainable peace requires far more than elite 
agreements.‟ According to Lederach (1997), a conflict has long-term relational, structural, 
contextual and cultural dimensions. That means a conflict is caused by and changes the 
actors, their relationships, social institutions and the narratives that underpin their 
24 
 
interactions and identities. In the words of Botes (2003: 1), a conflict „moves through 
certain predictable phases, transforming relationships and social organisation.‟ This 
fundamental dictum of conflict resolution makes the conflict transformation theory very 
useful to this study because it is primarily concerned with the changes of the actors, their 
relations, the structures in which they interact and their cultural context. As Dukes (1999: 
48, cited in Botes, 2003: 10) writes, conflict transformation entails „transformation of the 
individuals, transformation of the relationships, and transformation of the social systems, 




The first postulate concerns the transformation of the actors. Parties to a conflict have 
certain perceptions towards their adversaries, the conflict and the structures in which they 
interact. As Lederach (1997: 63) puts it, a „conflict is born in the world of human meaning 
and perception.‟ This means transforming a conflict requires changing the perceptions of 
the actors towards their adversaries and their view of the conflict. Botes (2003) calls this 
transformation of the emotional, perceptual and spiritual dimensions of a conflict. Actor 
transformation, according to Ramsbotham et al (2005:163), requires redefinition of 
directions, modification or abandonment of cherished goals, and „adoption of radically 
different perspectives‟, that is, „new goals, values and beliefs‟. This postulate has 
immediate relevance to the Somali conflict and peace processes. International actors have 
cherished goals and interests that have premised their interventions; thus, assessing the 
impact of their interests on the peace processes entails evaluating how they have 




The second postulate concerns the transformation of the relationships between the actors. 
Lederach (1997: 63) argues that a conflict is caused and „constantly changed by ongoing 
human interaction… and the social environment in which it is born.‟ Ramsbotham et al 
(2005: 163) refers to this as „the structure of relationship within which the parties operate.‟ 
According to this postulate, relationship transformation requires changing the norms that 
define the relationship, redefining roles in the relationship, altering how the parties 
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communicate, redefining patterns of interaction, and correcting power imbalances between 
the parties (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). This 
postulate is equally relevant to this study. If a peace process aims to end violence and 
rebuild institutions, as Covey et al (2005) argue, then exploring the effect of international 
interveners on Somalia‟s peace processes means assessing how these actors have 




The third postulate focuses on the transformation of the structure within which a conflict 
occurs. As Vayrynen (1991: 163, cited in Botes, 2003) avers, „structural transformation 
alludes to changes that may transpire in the system or structure within which the conflict 
occurs, which is more than just the limited changes among actors, issues and roles.‟ 
According to this postulate, transforming the structure means changing the political, 
economic and socio-cultural institutions as the conflict arose because these institutions 
could not address the causative grievances (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et 
al, 2005; Ross, 2000). Some of these structural issues are, as (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 
163) have noted, embedded in the regional and international context.  Thus, the relevance 
of this postulate to the conflict and peace processes in Somalia cannot be belaboured. As 
Arnson (1999) argues, structural issues comprise the core of the substantive agenda of 
peace processes. In essence, then, assessing the role that international actors have played 
in Somalia‟s peace processes entails evaluating how their interests have hampered or 
contributed towards transformation of the structural issues.  
 
Cultural context transformation 
 
The fourth postulate addresses the cultural dimension, which refers to the way societies 
understand and respond to conflicts, and the narratives and discourses that underpin social 
interactions and identities‟ formation (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ross, 2000). As Ross 
(2000: 1020) writes, conflicts „should be understood as social and cultural constructions 
whose meanings can be transformed as people change their knowledge, perceptions and 
models of what is at stake.‟ In other words, transforming the cultural dimension requires 
changing the way parties to the conflict understand and frame the conflict, and altering the 
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discourses that forms the basis of their identities.  Clearly, this is an important dimension 
in conflict transformation in Somalia.   
 
In sum, the conflict transformation theory is very useful to this study because ending direct 
violence in Somalia, a s the int ernational interveners have be en se eking to do, re quire 
transforming the attitudes of the internal actors, their view of  the conflict and their 
relationships. Moreover, re -building state  a nd socia l institutions in Somalia, as 
international actors ha ve been a ttempting to do, require tra nsformation of  the structural 
and cultural violence. That means assessing the effect of the international interveners in  
Somalia‟s post-2001 pe ace p rocesses requires analysing the  e xtent to which the y h ave 
transformed the  internal actors, their re lationships, their socia l structures and the 








































2.4 Conclusion  
 
The protracted conflict in Somalia has been a subject of popular and academic 
commentaries, but few of these discourses are premised on peace studies‟ theories. 
Instead, most are anchored on historical, anthropological and political science 
perspectives. Moreover, there are very few texts that specifically focus on international 
interventions in Somalia‟s peace processes. This subject has instead been covered in the 
generic literature on the broad themes around the conflict such as causes and consequences 
of state collapse and Islamism and terrorism. This dissertation partly seeks to address that 
gap. Therefore, the first aim of this chapter was to review that generic literature with a 
view to explore the accumulated scholarship on peace processes, and to survey how 
scholars of Somali studies have framed their arguments and conceptualised international 
peace interventions. The second aim of the chapter was to introduce the peace studies 
theoretical approaches that will be employed in this study of the effect of international 


























The protracted conflict in Somalia is not just a humanitarian disaster, but it has also raised 
concerns that the country may have become a sanctuary of international terrorists. Those 
concerns have been aggravated by the emergent problem of piracy along the coast of 
Somalia. Menkhaus (2003a) has rightly observed that the nature and severity of the 
warfare in Somalia has changed much since 1991 when the state collapsed.6 From brutal 
massacres in the early 1990s, to localised clashes in the late 1990s, to internationalised 
insurgency in the late 2000s, the conflict can currently be characterised as having three 
main features. It is intractable. It has been affected by the duration effect, that is, the 
longer the conflict has persisted the higher the number of actors it has drawn in. It also 
comprises a complex web of inter-related but different conflicts: the unresolved civil war 
that led to state collapse, political Islam versus liberal Islam and external actors, and 
second-tier conflicts that flourish due to lack of a state. This chapter aims to map the 
conflict with a view to contextualise the discourses and issues discussed in the previous 
chapters and the international peace interventions within Somalia‟s conflict dynamics.  
 






Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa and shares borders with Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Djibouti, and is adjacent to Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. It also borders the Indian 
                                                          
6 This dissertation employs the term state collapse while most literature refers to Somalia as a failed state. 
Menkhaus (2003a), for instance, has referred to Somalia as a failure among failed states. However, state 
failure and state collapse are conceptually distinct. William Zartman (1995) and Robert Rotberg (2003) have 
argued that a failed state is one where all core functions have ceased to be performed (on a continuous base 
and over the entire territory), but where some institutional structures still exist. They see this as a functional 
failure without institutional failure. They further argue that a collapsed state involves both a functional 
failure and an institutional failure, that is, the political superstructure has ceased to exist on a continuous 
base and as part of an integrative framework. Thus, a collapsed state is a more acute version of state failure. 
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Ocean and the Red Sea. Somalia has a land area of 637 660 km2, and its coastline extends 
3 300 kilometres. Somalia‟s location has always attracted international forces that seek to 
control the intersection of the two strategic waterways, the Gulf of Aden, which connects 
East and West and facilitates the transportation of much of the world‟s crude oil (Khalid, 
2010; Osman, 2007). Thus, Somalia‟s strategic location has been an important factor in its 




Map 3.1: Somalia in the Horn of Africa (source: World Atlas) 
Landscape and climate 
 
The northern part of Somalia is hilly and the altitude ranges between 900 and 2,100 meters 
(3,000 ft.-7,000 ft.) above sea level. The central and southern areas are flat, with an 
average altitude of less than 180 meters (600 ft.). Two rivers, the Jubba and Shabelle, rise 
in Ethiopia and flow across Somalia toward the Indian Ocean; the Shabelle does not reach 
the ocean. Major climatic factors include a year-round hot climate, seasonal monsoon 
winds, and irregular rainfall with recurring droughts. May to October and December to 
February are cool months due to the southwest and northeast monsoons respectively. The 
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other months are hot and humid. The central and northern regions are semi-arid and their 
inhabitants practice nomadic pastoralism rearing mostly camels, cattle and goats (Aidid 
and Ruhela, 1994; Lewis, 2008; Mukhtar, 1996). The area between the two rivers is the 
most agriculturally productive part of the country and the inhabitants practice agro-
pastoralism and sedentary farming (Besteman, 1999a, 1995; Kusow, 1995; Lewis, 2008; 
Mukhtar, 1996). The inter-riverine area has experienced the worst violence and population 
displacement since 1988, when warfare escalated.  
 
3.2.2 Ethno-cultural structure 
 
No reliable statistical data has been collected in Somalia for more than three decades. The 
country actually dropped out of the UNDP‟s Human Development Index (HDI) reporting 
in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, the 2010 World Population Datasheet (WPD) estimates the 
population of Somalia to be 9.4 million. More than one million Somalis are in the diaspora 
(Healy and Sheikh, 2009), while more than 2.2 million are internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and refugees (UNHCR, 2011). Majority of Somalis are Muslims.  
 
Studies on Somalia‟s ethno-cultural structure falls into two categories: homogeneous and 
heterogeneous (Osman, 2007). The homogeneous narrative traces Somalis‟ origin to the 
shores of the Red Sea and portrays them as people who share the same language, culture, 
religion, common ancestry and engage in camel and cattle nomadism. Premised on 
segmentary lineage approach, it divides Somalis into six patrilineal clans: Darood, Dir, 
Hawiye, Isaaq, Digil and Rahanweyn (also called Mirifle) (Hesse, 2010; Kusow, 1995; 
Lewis, 2008, 2004, 1993, 1972; Osman, 2007; Samatar, 1992). This homogeneous view of 
the Somali society has been the most pervasive in the media and in scholarly writings. 
Some attribute its prevalence to I.M. Lewis‟s dominance of Somali studies (Samatar, 
1992; Kusow, 1995). Others attribute its pervasiveness to its appropriation as the official 
discourse by post-colonial governments (Osman, 2007).  
 
The heterogeneous view questions the Red Sea origin hypothesis and homogeneity of the 
Somali society. It asserts that the linguistic and socio-cultural structures of southern 
Somalis indicate that southern Somalia was „the earlier location of the Somali-speaking 
people‟ (Kusow, 1995: 102). The view adds that the structural differences between the 
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northern and southern Somali languages, including mutual unintelligibility, questions the 
common ancestry myth. It also stresses that Somalia is ethno-culturally, occupationally 
and socially diverse (Besteman, 1999, 1996a, 1996b, 1995; Eno et al, 2010; Kusow, 1995; 
Mukhtar, 1996; Osman, 2007). Indeed, northern-central Somalis practice camel-cattle 
nomadism and speak Af-mahaay, while southerners from the inter-riverine region practice 
agro-pastoralism and speak Af-maay-maay. The two languages are as different as Spanish 
and Portuguese (Lewis, 2008, 2004; Mukhtar, 1996; Osman, 2007). Further, the Jubba and 
Shabelle valleys are pre-dominantly occupied by the culturally distinct Jareer group (also 
called waGosha or Somali Bantus), who are settled farmers, whilst other distinct groups 
such as Jiddu, Dabarre, Bajuni, Baraawe, Hadamo and Banadiri also inhabit the Southern 
region (Besteman, 1999, 1996a; Eno et al, 2010; Kusow, 1995; Mukhtar, 1996; Webersik, 
2004). This empirical evidence negates the homogeneous view. Additionally, the clan 
discourse ignores important horizontal identities such as social class, race and location of 
origin.  
 
3.2.3 Historical development 
 
Somalia before 1960 
 
Pre-colonial Somali society had no formal, centralised political organisation. It maintained 
social order and justice through moral, material and social sanctions that were executed 
through a code of conduct known as xeer and the Islamic law (Hesse, 2010; Lewis, 2008; 
Mahmoud, 2006; Samatar, 1992). In the 1880s, imperial powers divided the area inhabited 
by Somalis into five regions: British, French, and Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Ogadeen 
and the Northern Frontier District in British East Africa (modern Kenya). The colonial 
rule spawned violent resistance and Somali nationalism that attained its zenith in the 
1950s. Somalia attained independence on 01 July 1960 as a Union of the Italian and the 
British Somaliland. The country‟s flag had a five pointed star indicating a desire to bring 
to the Union the other three territories. However, the Ogadeen region and the Northern 
Frontier District remained part of Ethiopia and Kenya respectively, while the French 





















Map 3.2: 1960 Somalia and post-1969 Somalia 
 
Elite factional conflicts, 1960-1969 
 
Independent Somalia pursued two objec tives: pa n-Somali nationalism and domesti c 
nation-building. P an-Somali nationalism „sought to incorporate the Somali-inhabited 
portions of neighbouring countries into a larger pan-Somali nation-state‟ (Schraeder, 2006: 
107). Thus, it negated the Organisation of African Unity‟s (OAU) fundamental principle 
of respecting the inher ited borders a nd led to the S omali-Ethiopian war of 1964 a nd 
Somalia‟s support for shifta insurgents in Kenya.7 The nation-building objective also had 
its challenges (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Lewis, 2008, 1972; Schraeder, 2006). The country 
did not hold the unity referendum sti pulated in the 1960 Act of  Union. This fuelled 
secessionist sentiments in Somaliland, which led to the rejection of the new constitution in 
June 1961 re ferendum and a  mut iny by army of ficers in Ha rgeisa. Also, the competing 
                                                          
7 In October 1962, the leaders of the ethnic Somalis in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) demanded the 
integration of the region into Somalia. Both Britain and the Kenyan government rejected the demand. Two 
weeks a fter Ken ya attained i ndependence i n Dec ember 1 963, So mali p ressures forced th e new state to 
declare a s tate of emergency in the NFD. Shifta is a Somali word for the insurgents who were fighting the 
Kenyan government with a view to secede from Kenya and join Somalia. Somalia renounced the NFD claim 
in 1968.  
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elites undermined the political system as they organised politics around clan identities in a 
context where 90% of the population lacked formal education. Additionally, integrating 
former British and Italian designed institutions proved a herculean task. Unable to cope, 
the elite adopted patrimonialism that generated power struggles along clan lines. 
Subsequent efforts to undermine democracy through electoral fraud generated a crisis of 
the state. The elite conflicts culminated in the assassination of President Abdul Rashid 
Shermake on the 18 October 1969 and a military coup three days later.  
 
The rise of fascism, 1969-1978 
 
The coup leader, General Mohamed Siyaad Barre, suspended the constitution, banned 
political activities, dissolved parliament, replaced the civilian cabinet with a Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC) and arrested members of the previous government (Lewis, 
1972; Osman, 2007). He also declared scientific socialism the official ideology, Islam the 
official religion, and outlawed „public and private acknowledgement of the existence of 
clans‟ (Besteman, 1996b: 587). In addition, Barre enacted populist policies such as a mass 
literacy campaign and writing of the standard Somali using Roman orthography8, which 
became the official language (Besteman, 1996b; Lewis, 1972; Schraeder, 2006). General 
Barre also orchestrated „ritualised celebrations of pan-Somali cultural heroes‟ (Besteman, 
1996b: 588).  
 
Unfortunately, Barre‟s rule generated a crisis of legitimacy. As Besteman (1996b: 587) 
avers, questions about the government‟s orientation were „bolstered by Siyaad‟s overt 
manipulation of the clan relations through distribution of favours and jobs.‟ That is, 
Barre‟s „regime constituted an even more polarised clan-based structure than the previous 
regimes‟ (Osman, 2007: 104). The peak of Barre‟s pan-Somali nationalism, the 1977-78 
irredentist war to recapture the Ogadeen, proved to be an unmitigated disaster. Ethiopia, 
with support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, defeated Somalia. Thus, „Siyaad‟s greatest 
                                                          
8 There was no written Somali language before 1972. Previous governments had debated whether to use 
Roman, Arabic or Ismaaniya scripts (Lewis, 1972: 407). The „standard‟ Somali language that was adopted in 
1972 is the af-Mahaay of the northern Somalis. Catherine Besteman (1996b: 588) notes that the adoption of 
the Af Mahaay as the standard and, therefore the official language, and exclusion of af-Maay Maay, which is 
also widely spoken, „left a bitter legacy among Maay Maay speakers.‟ The exclusion formed the basis of 
their resistance to the regime as „they were marginalized in the nation-building effort when their language 
was excluded from the literacy program‟ (Besteman, 1996b: 588).  
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nationalist effort [became] his greatest debacle‟ (Besteman, 1996b: 589). Instead of 
unifying Somalis, the Ogadeen war marked the beginning of the end of Barre‟s rule and 
the unravelling of Somalia.  
 
3.3. The first civil war, 1982-1990 
 
The first civil war started shortly after the Ogadeen war. Its causes were: Somalia‟s defeat 
in the Ogadeen war, elite conflicts over state resources and unbridled militarism. 
Somalia‟s defeat led to blame and recriminations in the military that triggered an 
attempted coup in April 1978 (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Besteman, 1996a). Some coup 
leaders were arrested and executed in Mogadishu in October 1978, while others fled to 
Ethiopia where they started an armed opposition, the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) 
(Lewis, 2008). The defeat also led to an economic recession from which the country never 
recovered. Additionally, the defeat led to an influx of Ogadeen Somali refugees „who were 
settled among northern farmers and pastoralists of the Isaaq clan‟ (Besteman, 1996b: 589). 
The settlement coupled with Barre‟s efforts to control livestock and khat (a popular 
stimulant) businesses in Hargeisa triggered an armed resistance in the north-west region 
spearheaded by the Somali National Movement (SNM). The government‟s response to the 
rebellion was a harsh military campaign that included bombing and starving of northern 
towns, villages and rural encampments, disruption of economic activities, destruction of 
water catchments and burning down of villages (Besteman, 1996a; Lewis, 2008; 
Menkhaus, 2003a). The war between the SNM and Barre‟s government cost 60,000 lives, 
400,000 IDPs and refugees (Menkhaus, 2003a). 
 
Meanwhile, the elite competition intensified because the state had become the primary 
source of wealth accumulation (Besteman, 1996b; Hesse, 2010; Samatar, 1992). Besteman 
(1996a: 126) writes that because „the state became a primary source of wealth and 
resources, competition among the new urban elite who gained prominence in the 1980s 
often played out along bloodlines.‟ Worsening elite competition was Barre‟s unbridled 
militarism. In the 1970s, Somalia received massive military aid from the Soviet Union to 
counter the US presence in Ethiopia (Besteman, 1996a; Menkhaus, 2003a; Osman, 2007; 
Webersik, 2004). But the superpowers switched sides after the Ogadeen war. Between 
1980 and 1988, the US gave Somalia military aid worth $163.5 million which it used to 
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amass a huge army; the country had an average of 12 soldiers per 1 000 people, compared 
to the regional average of less than 4 per 1 000 people (Osman, 2007).  
 
Thus, a s the centre we akened, th e c onvergence of  mi litarism, economic de cline a nd 
escalating insur gency made  we apons the spoil of the war, which c ivilians turned to for 
survival (Lewis, 2008; Osman, 2007). In late 1980s, the rebellion spread to the rest of the 
country wh ere two mor e a rmed moveme nts, the United Somali C ongress (USC) and 
Somali P atriotic Movement (SP M), emerged in the central a nd south-west re gions 
respectively. A full -scale uprising of USC supporters in Mogadishu defeated Barre‟s 
government in January 1991. His fall led to state collapse as the armed movements „were 

















Figure 3.1: Linking conflict causes 
 
A summary of  the main actors, their relationship and behaviour between 1982 and 1990 
are provided in tables 3.1 and 3.2 
 
 
Defeat in Ogadeen war  
Clan/ethnic-based exclusion  







Table 3.1: Summary of the main actors, 1982-1990 
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Table 3.2: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 1982-1990 
 
Actor Attitude  Behaviour Contradiction 
Government of 
Siyaad Barre 
-Viewed itself as the 
legitimate authority 
-Viewed opposition 
groups as enemies  
-Viewed Gen. Barre 
as the „father of the 
nation‟9 
-Viewed state as an 
instrument of capital 
accumulation 
-Viewed minorities 
in the south as 





in north-west  
-Armed Ogadeen 
refugees  





of the minorities in 






exclusion in national 
institutions 
-Nationalisation of 
all productive assets 
including land, 
industries and  
livestock & khat 
trade 
-Used state 
institutions as the 






                                                          
9 Besteman (1996b: 588) argues that as a self-proclaimed „father of the nation‟, Gen. Barre „constructed a 
highly elaborate mandatory personality cult around himself.‟  He also sought to appropriate the mantle of 
Sayyid Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (the „mad Mullah‟), the sheikh who led the 1900-1920 Dervish 
resistance against the British rule. In Besteman‟s (1996b:588) words, Siyaad symbolically sought to „identify 
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pumps.  
and mass poverty 
Somali National 
Movement (SNM) 
- Viewed the 
Government as an 
enemy  
- Viewed north-
west people as a 
threatened  
minority 
- Viewed itself as 
the defender of 
north-west 
interests 
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national liberation 
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in the central 
rangelands and in 
Mogadishu 
-Full scale uprising 









-Viewed itself as the 
defender of Ogadeen 
interests  
-Viewed the 
government as an 
enemy  




in the South 
-Fought against the 
USC forces  
As above 
 
3.4. The Second civil war, 1991 - present 
 
Phase I  War for all against all, 1991 - 1996 
 
The immediate post-Barre era involved many conflict issues. While the armed movements 
disagreed on power sharing and the structure of the state, the SNM declared secession of 
the north-west region to form the Republic of Somaliland (Lewis, 2008, 2004; Menkhaus, 
2010b). In the south, new militia groups emerged among them Somali Democratic 
Movement (SDM) and former Barre‟s forces, who re-grouped as Somali National Front 
(SNF). Meanwhile, the main movements‟ fragmented into smaller factions (Lewis, 2004, 
1993; Menkhaus, 2003a). The USC, for example, split into the USC/Somali National 
Alliance (USC/SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid, and the USC/Somali 
Salvation Alliance (USC/SSA) under Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Additionally, all militia 
factions desired to control the productive land resources in the south, infrastructure such as 
roads and ports, and valuable urban real estate (Besteman, 1996b; Eno et al, 2010; 
Menkhaus, 2003a; Mukhtar, 1996; Samatar, 1992). The convergence of these issues led to 
a vicious war that ravaged southern Somalia.10  
 
                                                          
10 According to May 1992 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, No Mercy in Mogadishu,  the battle for the 
control of Mogadishu between the two USC factions was so ruthless that it greatly exceeded the destruction 
inflicted on the country during the first civil war.  
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The main victims of the violence were the agricultural communities and coastal minority 
groups.  These communities played no role in Barre‟s government or in the rebellion 
against it, but they had been stigmatised as racially and socially inferior and their lands 
became the major battle grounds (Besteman, 1999a, 1996a, 1996b; Eno et al, 2010; 
Menkhaus, 2003a; Mukhtar, 1996). The violence displaced 1.7 million people, over one-
third of the entire population in the Southern Somalia (Ahmed and Green, 1999; 
Besteman, 1996b). By August 1992, more than 250 000 people had died due to war and 
famine, while 4.5 million suffered from acute malnutrition (Ahmed and Green, 1999; 
Menkhaus, 2010a). Much worse, the international relief that aimed to assist them became 
an additional source of income for the militia groups. Besides robbery, blackmail, and 
roadblocks that „taxed‟ the international relief organisations, the militia groups provided 
interpreters and security services. Moreover, those who controlled the ports and airports 
resold the relief for profit, or they prevented it from being delivered upcountry to stop 
their rivals from accessing it (Menkhaus, 1991 cited in Besteman, 1996a; Mukhtar, 1996).  
 
The dire humanitarian situation attracted the interventions of the OAU and the UN. In 
March 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 751 that imposed a 
ceasefire and stipulated deployment of the United Nations Mission in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) to monitor the ceasefire (Diel, 1996; Menkhaus, 2003a; Sahnoun, 1994). 
Persistent violation of the ceasefire forced the UNSC to expand UNOSOM I‟s mandate in 
August 1992 to protection of humanitarian convoys and the UN personnel. Fighting 
continued, however, forcing the UNSC to authorise a US-led Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF), which comprised of 28 000 US troops. UNITAF‟s mandate of protecting and 
safeguarding relief efforts lasted until May 1993 when the UNSC replaced it with 
UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II failed to end hostilities and it was withdrawn in March 1995. 
A summary of the main actors‟ attitudes and behaviours is provided in table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 1991-1995 
 
Actor Attitude Behaviour Contradiction 
USC/SNA -Viewed itself as the 
liberator of Somalia 
-Fought vicious 
battles with other 
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SDM (later renamed 
Rahanweyn 
Resistance Army – 
RRA) 
-Viewed itself as the 
defender of the 
Rahanweyn clans 
-Viewed other 
groups as enemies 
-Fought vicious 
battles with other 
groups particularly 




Phase II:  The reign of the warlords, 1996-2000 
 
Armed conflicts prevailed in 1995 after UNOSM II‟s withdrawal, but the nature, duration 
and intensity of the warfare changed significantly (Menkhaus, 2010b, 2003a). The most 
important developments were substantial decreases in banditry and looting and 
decentralisation of warfare to lower clan lineages (Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2010b, 2003a, 
2006).11 For the next four years, central-southern Somalia was curved into several 
fiefdoms controlled by a several faction leaders (or warlords), who drew their power from 
sub-clan support and control of light and heavy weapons and important economic 
infrastructures including ports and airports.  
 
Phase III:   The rise of the Islamists, 2000 – 2006 
 
Some Islamic relief organisations such as Al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI) expanded their 
activities while the Sharia courts also emerged after 1995 (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot 
and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2003a, 2002a). In 1999, the Mogadishu business class 
switched its financial support from warlords to the Sharia courts in order to improve 
security (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2007, 2006). To 
unify and enhance their effectiveness, the localised courts established the Sharia 
Implementation Council (SIC) in 2000.  The business class also supported the 2000 
                                                          
11Among the militia groups that emerged at this time are Somali Salvation National Movement (SSNM), 
United Somali Front (USF), Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), Somali Africans Muke Organisation 
(SAMO), Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), Somali National Union (SNU), United Somali Party 
(USP), Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) and Allied 
Somali Forces (ASF). Some of the warlords who emerged at this time were former General Aidid supporters 
such as Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Osman Hassan Ali Atto and Hussein Haji Bod, as well as former Ali 
Mahdi Mohamed supporters such as Muse Sudi Yalahow and Omar Mohammed Mahmood (alias Mahmood 
Muhammad Finish). Gen. Aidid and Ali Mahdi died in 1996 and1999 respectively.   
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Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) that had been initiated by the government of 
Djibouti. The peace process produced a Transitional National Government (TNG), which 
failed to exercise authority due to internal weaknesses and external factors (see chapter 4).  
 
IGAD responded by initiating another peace process that took place in Kenya from 2002 
to 2004. It produced a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which also failed to 
exercise authority due to internal weaknesses and external factors (see chapter 4). TFG‟s 
weakness revived the fortunes of the Sharia Courts that were by then „facing declining 
legitimacy and local support‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 364). In 2004, the Courts established the 
SCIC, which was the strongest political and militia force in Mogadishu by mid-June 2005 
(Menkhaus, 2007). By June 2006, the SCIC had defeated the US supported Alliance for 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) and it established a unified 
administration in Mogadishu, the first one in 16 years (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot 
and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2007). SCIC‟s success alarmed international actors 
particularly Ethiopia. With support from the US, Ethiopia intervened militarily in 
December 2006, defeated the SCIC and installed the TFG in Mogadishu in January 2007.  
 
Phase IV:  2007 – Present 
 
Ethiopia‟s intervention attracted a fierce insurgency led by Al Shabaab. Meanwhile, 
former SCIC supporters regrouped in Eritrea where they formed the Alliance for Re-
Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). In May 2008, 
the UN initiated a peace process that took place in Djibouti, but only the moderate 
Islamists signed the agreement (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). The Al-Shaabab and 
Hizbul al-Islam opted to continue with the war. The moderate Islamist leader, Sheikh 
Sharif Ahmed, became the President of the unity government on 31 January 2009. 
Meanwhile, Ethiopia pulled out of Somalia in December 2008 and was replaced by 







Table 3.4: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 2007-Present 
 
Actor Attitude Behaviour Contradiction 
 SCIC  -Viewed itself as 
having domestic 
legitimacy 
-Viewed the TFG 
and its allies as 
Ethiopian lackeys 
-Viewed Ethiopia as  



















-Lack of a state 
-Hegemonic control 
















-Prefers a devolved 
government 
-Has fought battles 
with Al-shaabab and 
Hizbul al-Islam 




In addition to the 
above 






-Views itself as an 
Islamic liberation 
movement 
-Views the TFG, 
Puntland and 
Somaliland as 
lackeys of Ethiopian 
hegemony 
-Has fought deadly 
battles with TFG 
forces 
-Has employed 
bombing and other 
terror tactics 
-Has implemented 





actors such as 
Ethiopia as the main 
enemy  
areas it controls 
-It is supported by 
foreign Islamic 
fighters  
Hizbul al-Islam -Views itself as an 
Islamic liberation 
movement 
-Views the TFG as 
an agent of external 
forces 
-Is ambivalent over 
the role of external 
actors 
-It opposed the 2008 
Djibouti peace 
process 





Ahlu Sunna wal 
Jama‟a (ASWJ) 
-View itself as a 
defender of 
traditional Sufism 
-View the TFG 
positively 
-Views Al-Shaabab 
as a terrorist 
organisation 
-Has fought fierce 
battles with Al-
Shaabab 




3.5. Conclusion   
 
The aim of this chapter was to map the conflict in Somalia in order to provide a 
background to the discourses and issues, and to situate international peace interventions 
within Somalia‟s conflict dynamics. The mapping has shown that the conflict in Somalia 
is more complex than is generally portrayed as it is rooted in frustrated national ambitions, 
weak state structures, inability to build a national identity and political, economic and 
social exclusion. The mapping has also shown that Islamism in Somalia emerged as a 
response to state collapse and has been primarily a vehicle for channelling of humanitarian 




Chapter 4  
The Peace Processes 
4.1 Introduction 
 
There is no universally agreed definition of the term peace process because „the extensive 
set of variables involved greatly complicates the task of definition‟ (Darby and Ginty, 
2003: 2). Nonetheless, peace and conflict scholars have clearly conceptualised peace 
processes. Pearman (2008:79) has referred to a peace process „as a sustained effort to 
negotiate a lasting solution to a protracted conflict between states and/or non-state groups.‟ 
Similarly, Arnson (1999:1) has conceptualised a peace process as „an effort to end armed 
confrontation by reaching agreements that touch on at least some of the principal political, 
economic, social and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place.‟ That is, a 
peace process entails negotiations over the underlying causes of the conflict and signing 
peace agreements that address these causes. Other scholars have provided five criteria that 
a peace process must include: actors‟ willingness to negotiate in good faith, commitment 
by the primary actors to the process, inclusiveness, no violence in pursuance of objectives, 
and desire to address substantive conflict issues (Darby, 2001; Darby and Ginty, 2003). 
Advancing a similar argument, Covey et al (2003: 14) write that a peace process must 
dislodge „violent-prone power structures‟ through reducing motivations and means for 
pursuing violent conflict.  
 
Inherent in these conceptualisations are four ideas. First, a peace process involves series of 
activities from pre-negotiation to peace agreement implementation.  Second, a peace 
process is deemed successful if it ends violence. This means that a peace process has to 
address transformation of the actors‟ perceptions, their relationships and the structures that 
breed violence. Third, a successful peace process has to lay the foundation for building 
post-agreement institutions that would henceforth resolve conflicts peacefully. Fourth, a 
peace process has to reduce the motives and change the narratives that propel protagonists 
to use violence. One can therefore argue that Somalia‟s peace processes have not been 
successful. Thus, the first aim of this chapter is to highlight the main peace processes and 
explore why they have failed to end violence or to build sustainable institutions. The 




4.2 Pre-2001 peace processes 
 
4.2.1 From Djibouti I to UNOSOM II 
 
Djibouti I and II peace conferences 
 
Djibouti I and II peace conferences were hosted by President Hassan Guled Aptidon in 
June and July 1991. The 5-11 June conference was attended by representatives of SSDF, 
SPM, SDM and USC. The SNM did not attend. The main aims of the conference were to 
discuss the escalating violence, appoint an interim government and explore methods of 
removing President Barre from Somalia as he had retreated to his native Gedo region 
(Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Kasaija, 2010). Participants signed a ceasefire agreement and 
resolved to hold another meeting in July. The 15-21 July conference was supported by 
Italy, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and attended by all armed factions except the SNM (Aidid 
and Ruhela, 1994; Kasaija, 2010). It also attracted observers from the OAU, the LAS, the 
OIC, all neighbouring states and countries such as Libya and the US (Kasaija, 2010). Its 
main resolutions included expulsion of General Barre by military force, implementation of 
the June ceasefire agreement, respect for Somalia‟s territorial integrity, and formation of 
an all-inclusive government (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Kasaija, 2010). The conference also 
appointed Ali Mahdi as interim president for two years, promulgated the 1960 constitution 
for not more than two years and proposed a 123-member parliament (Aidid and Ruhela, 
1994). However, all resolutions could not be implemented because facilitators lacked 
leverage over the warring factions, parties disagreed over power sharing, intra-USC wars, 
proliferation of militia factions, and external actors, principally Italy, were not seen as 
impartial (Ghebremeskel, 2002; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). The UN 
did not participate in both conferences12 (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000; Sahnoun, 1994).  
 
From UNOSOM I to UNITAF 
 
Somalia descended into anarchy after the failure of the Djibouti II peace process, which 
prompted the UNSC to adopt resolution 733 on 23 January 1992 that imposed an arms 
                                                          
12 The escalation of the civil war in Somalia, the fall of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre and the collapse of 
the Somali state coincided with the first Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in the 
Balkans. Thus, the UN and the Western powers were focused on those wars.  
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embargo. The UN Secretary General (UNSG) then invited the OAU, LAS, OIC and 
faction leaders General Aidid and Ali Mahdi for consultation in New York on 12-14 
February 1992 where they agreed to a ceasefire (UNOSOM, 1995). The UN then sent a 
high level delegation of the UN, OAU, LAS and the OIC to Mogadishu where Aidid and 
Mahdi signed a ceasefire agreement on 3 March (UNOSOM, 1995). The UNSC followed 
the ceasefire with resolution 746 of 17 March that authorised UN personnel to monitor the 
ceasefire and supervise provision of humanitarian relief (UNOSOM, 1995; Diel, 1996; 
Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). The UNSC then adopted resolution 751 on 24 April that 
established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) comprising of 50 
military observers and 500 troops. In response to persistent violations of the ceasefire, the 
UNSC passed resolutions 767 of 27 July and 775 of 28 August that increased UNOSOM 
troops to 4, 219 (UNOSOM, 1995). However, violence persisted and militia factions 
attacked UNOSOM forces.   
 
The UNSC responded to these attacks through resolution 794 of 3 December that 
established the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The US assumed the command of the 
UNITAF – codenamed Operation Restore Hope - that comprised of 28 000 US troops and 
17 000 troops from other UN members (Sahnoun, 1994; UNOSOM, 1995). By January 
1993, UNITAF had deployed 37,000 troops in southern-central region, an area covering 
40% of the country's territory. Meanwhile, the UNSG convened a preparatory meeting for 
the envisaged national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 4-15 January 1993 
(UNOSOM, 1995). Fourteen factions attended the preparatory meeting which concluded 
with signing of three agreements: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993, the 
Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and the 
Agreement on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for the Conference on National 
Reconciliation (UNOSOM, 1995).   
 
Addis Ababa Conference March 1993 
 
The UN convened a Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia in Addis Ababa 
on 11-13 March 1993 and followed it with a Conference on National Reconciliation on 15 
March 1993. Fifteen armed factions, civil society and women‟s groups attended the 
reconciliation conference (Kasaija, 2010; UNOSOM, 1995). Meanwhile, the country still 
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had no state or functioning government. That prompted the UNSC to pass resolution 814 
on 26 March 1993 that changed UNITAF to UNOSOM II, a Chapter VII peacekeeping 
mission, whose mandate included protecting civilians, disarming warring factions and 
promoting reconciliation (UNOSOM, 1995). On 27 March, all the fifteen faction leaders 
attending the Addis Ababa reconciliation conference signed a peace agreement whose key 
stipulations covered disarmament, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of 
property, settlement of disputes and transitional mechanisms (Kasaija, 2010; UNOSOM, 
1995). The latter included a Transitional National Council (TNC) made up of three 
representatives from each region (including one woman), five additional seats for 
Mogadishu, and one representative from each of the fifteen factions. UNOSOM II 
commenced its operations in May 1993, but fighting continued and the Addis Ababa 
agreement collapsed. Indeed, UNOSOM II's attempts to implement the disarmament 
provisions in the Addis Ababa agreement triggered battles between its troops and USC-
Aidid militias that killed 25 and wounded 54 Pakistan peacekeepers (Sahoun, 1994; 
UNOSOM, 1995). 
 
The UNSC responded through resolution 837 of 6 June that mandated UNOSOM II to 
initiate military operations. One such operation in South Mogadishu in October 1993 led 
to battles with Aidid‟s militia that downed two US helicopters, killed 18 US soldiers and 
wounded 75. Somali casualty figures are unknown. The „black hawk down‟ debacle led to 
a decisive US policy shift. Meanwhile, subsequent UNSC resolutions, 886 of 18 
November 1993 and 923 of 31 May 1994 renewed UNOSOM II‟s mandate to May 1994 
and October 1994 respectively. But it was clear that UNOSOM II‟s goal of assisting the 
national reconciliation process had failed. On 4 November 1994, the UNSC passed 
resolution 954 that authorised UNOSOM II to withdraw by 31 March 1995. Thereafter, 
the major international actors showed little interest in Somalia until 11 September 2001.  
 
4.2.2 Post-UNOSOM peace processes 
 
The Sodere peace conference   
 
The Sodere conference of December 1996 was the first post-UNOSOM II peace process. 
Several factors informed Ethiopia‟s intervention: national interest, the UN‟s preference for 
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a  regional approach after UNOSOM II‟s disaster, and the fact that Ethiopia had been 
elected the chair of IGAD and the newly created OAU‟s Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) (Ghebremeskel, 2002; Hansen, 2003; 
Abraham, 2002, cited in Hansen, 2003). The conference attracted 26 factions which signed 
a Joint Declaration on 3 January 1997. Some key protagonists, including Somaliland‟s 
leadership, did not participate. Key resolutions of the declaration were establishment of a 
National Salvation Council (NSC) with a mandate to organise a transitional government 
and convening of a National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) in Bosaso, Somalia, to 
approve a Transitional National Charter (TNC) in November 1997.  Mistrust and power-
sharing contests, operating in Addis Ababa, and competition between Ethiopia and Egypt 
hampered implementation. Indeed, another peace conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, 
instead of the Bosaso NRC.   
 
The Cairo peace conference  
 
The Cairo conference opened on 12 November 1997. It was attended by representatives of 
the NSC as formed in Sodere and their opponents who had boycotted the Sodere process. 
On 22 December 1997, the conference proclaimed the Cairo Declaration which stipulated 
regional self-administration and committed the parties to organise an NRC in Baidoa in 
February 1998 that would elect a presidential council, a prime minister and adopt a 
transitional charter. While some delegates signed the Cairo Declaration, others objected to 
the allocations of representations to the proposed NRC. Those objecting travelled to Addis 
Ababa, where they convened a meeting of the NSC that proposed changes to the Cairo 
Declaration and accused Egypt of "hijacking" the Sodere process and sabotaging the 
Bosaso NRC (Hansen, 2003; Healy, 2011). Moreover, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti 
faulted Egypt for disregarding their previous efforts and achievements and their security 
interests as Somalia‟s neighbours (Hansen, 2003).  
 
4.2.3 The Djibouti III peace process    
 
The Government of Djibouti convened the 2000 Somali National Peace Conference 
(SNPC) in the town of Arta. Other international actors, including the OAU, the UN, the 
AL, the UN, and the EU, supported the Djibouti initiative, but Ethiopia did not (Kasaija, 
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2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). The conference, which started as a series of 
meetings from 20 April to 5 May, reduced representation of the armed factions and 
emphasised the role of civil society (Hansen, 2003; Kasaija, 2010). Thus, most 
Mogadishu-based warlords, the Puntland and the Somaliland administrations did not 
attend. The conference elected a 245-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) 
using the 4.5 formula (Eno et al, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Schlee, 2010). The TNA 
enacted the Transitional National Charter (TNC) and elected the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) president. In turn, the president appointed a prime minister. Though 
the TNG received support from the Gulf countries, it could hardly assert itself for several 
reasons (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a, 2007; Schlee, 2010). First, it was undermined 
by warlords and other factions that feared return of the state. Second, it was fought by 
groups that objected to its vision of a centralised state. Third, it lacked policy 
implementation instruments and peace enforcement capabilities. In addition, Ethiopia 
mistrusted its composition and instead supported the Somalia Restoration and 
Reconciliation Council (SRRC), a loose coalition of all the factions that were opposed to 
the TNG. Consequently, the Arta process failed despite its early promise.   
  
4.3 Post-2001 peace processes 
 
4.3.1 The Nairobi process 
 
The failure of the TNG prompted IGAD to initiate the Somali National Peace and 
Reconciliation Conference (SNPRC) in 2002 in Kenya. Other international actors 
including the AU, UN, LAS, EU, Italy and the Gulf states explicitly supported the 
initiative. The conference opened on 15 October 2002 in Eldoret town, 300 kilometres 
north-west of Nairobi, and moved to Nairobi on 15 February 2003. It attracted all the 
major actors, including the TNG and the SRRC. Somaliland was invited, but declined to 
attend with the assertion that it was an independent state. The process was structured by 
the Technical Committee (TC) of the IGAD frontline states - Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya 
- into three phases: ceasefire declaration, resolution of substantive issues and power-
sharing (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Phase I of the conference 
concluded with a Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities on 27 October 2002. Though 
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all faction leaders signed the ceasefire agreement, they thereafter regularly violated it 
(ICG, 2003; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010).  
 
Phase II of the conference was led by the TC and a Leaders‟ Committee (LC) comprising 
of the faction leaders while negotiations occurred within six thematic committees13 
(Schlee, 2010). This phase produced a draft of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) 
which was signed on 15 September 2003 and revised on 29 January 2004 in the Safari 
Park Declaration (ICG, 2004a). The TFC formed the basis of the Transitional Federal 
Institutions (TFIs) namely a 275-member Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA) and a 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 
2004). Selection to the TFA was based on the 4.5 formula; that is, Darood, Hawiye, Dir 
and Dir-Rahanweyn clan-families would each have 60 MPs, while the minorities would 
contribute 35 (Eno et al. 2010; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). In October 2004, the TFA 
elected TFG president, who then appointed the prime minister. Some have argued that 
Ethiopia influenced the election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as the TFG president (Bamfo, 
2010; Healy, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Woodward, 2004).  
 
Soon thereafter, the TFG split into two broad wings over the interpretation of the Charter, 
deployment of international peacekeepers and location of the government. One wing, 
which was led by TFA Speaker Sheikh Hassan Aden, opposed deployment of international 
peacekeepers and preferred Mogadishu as the capital. The other wing, which was led by 
TFG President, Yusuf Abdullahi, preferred deployment and opted for Baidoa as the 
provisional capital until insecurity in Mogadishu was resolved. Ultimately, the dispute 
degenerated into a fractious war and the Nairobi process failed as the TFG could hardly 
exert its influence in Somalia after it relocated in June 2006. Nonetheless, the „TFG 
limped on until [the UN initiated] a new round of negotiations‟ in May 2008 in Djibouti 
(Kasaija, 2010: 9).  
 
Several factors caused the failure of the Nairobi process (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; 
Schlee, 2010).This process did not address the substantive conflict issues; the Mogadishu 
group rejected the TFG‟s federal vision; the process did not resolve mutual hostility 
                                                          
13 These committees were: „federalism and provisional charter; DDR; land and property rights; economic 
recovery, institution building and resource mobilisation; conflict resolution and reconciliation; and regional 
and international relations‟ (Schlee, 2010: 127). 
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between the former TNG and SRRC factions; the process did not address the pervasive 
complexity of fear that had been produced by the prolonged violence; the 4.5 formula had 
pitfalls; there were many spoilers who feared the return of a state authority; and finally the 
international actors supported the TFG without reservations even though it was a party to 
the post-Nairobi conflict.      
 
4.3.2 Sanaa reconciliation meeting  
 
Some MPs from the Speaker‟s wing boycotted TFA sessions in Nairobi in early 2005 and 
relocated to Mogadishu due to the conflict over the location of the capital and deployment 
of international peacekeepers (Menkhaus, 2007). Thus, the TFA did not meet again for the 
next year. Concerned about the conflict, the President of Yemen invited the protagonists to 
Sanaa for a reconciliation meeting in January 2006. At the end of the meeting on 5 January 
2006, President Yusuf and Sheikh Aden signed a reconciliation agreement that broke the 
deadlock within the TFIs. All international actors including the AU, the UN and the LAS 
welcomed the agreement. More importantly, the agreement allowed for convening of the 
first session of the TFA in Baidoa on 26 February 2006 (ICG, 2006b). Three months 
thereafter, on 14 June, the TFA adopted the National Security and Stabilisation Plan 
(NSSP) (ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007). In June, however, the SCIC emerged as the 
strongest military and political force in Mogadishu after defeating the US supported 
ARPTC.14   
 
4.3.3 Khartoum peace meeting  
 
SCIC‟s rise created the necessary conditions for dialogue. Whilst the defeated groups, 
which previously spoiled, recognised the need for resolution, hence, there were now two 
major groups, one with international support and no domestic legitimacy and the other one 
with domestic legitimacy and no international recognition. As Menkhaus (2007: 369) 
                                                          
14 The US had been concerned that failed states, particularly lawless Somalia, could become a sanctuary of 
international terrorists. The 7 August 1998 terrorists bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, and the 
2002 bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, escalated those fears. Menkhaus (2007: 368) has argued that 
lack of a central government in Somalia led the US „to forge partnerships with non-state actors on counter-
terrorism monitoring and rendition.‟ These non-state actors included warlords. The formation of the ARPCT 
by these warlords attracted the fury of the Islamists. They therefore engaged the ARPCT in a series of battles 
from January 2006 that culminated in the Islamists victory in June 2006. SCIC‟s rise reduced the TFG to a 
minor actor and worried Somaliland and Puntland administrations.      
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notes, the win of the SCIC over the ARPCT increased the „national power of the 
Islamists.‟ Indeed, the SCIC had a clear leadership structure, well-articulated political 
positions and a cross-cutting constituency (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). It 
therefore attracted a „broad and sometimes passionate support of Somalis‟ within Somalia 
and in the diaspora (Menkhaus, 2007: 370). Additionally, the SCIC unified Mogadishu for 
the first time in 16 years (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). Certainly, writes 
Menkhaus (2007: 370), „most of the international community‟ started pressuring the TFG 
„to engage in dialogue with the CIC in order to form a government of national unity.‟ It is 
on this basis that the TFG and the SCIC attended a peace meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, on 
22 June 2006. The Khartoum meeting led to mutual recognition. However, the SCIC‟s 
Islamist and pan-Somali orientation worried the Ethiopians (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and 
Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).  
 
As the war of words escalated between the SCIC and Ethiopia in July, Ethiopian troops 
entered Somalia, supposedly to support the TFG (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; 
Menkhaus, 2007). Consequently, the Khartoum power sharing deal collapsed as the SCIC 
refused to engage with the TFG as long as Ethiopian troops were in Somalia. In December 
2006, a full scale military confrontation ensued after the Islamists gave Ethiopia a seven 
day ultimatum to leave Somalia (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and 
Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2007). In January 2007, the Ethiopian military drove out the 
SCIC out of Somalia and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. This ouster triggered an 
insurgency. On 19 January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Commission (AUPSC) 
authorised the deployment of AMISOM for six months to support the TFIs (AMISOM, 
2010). On 27 February 2007 the UNSC approved the AUPSC authorisation (AMISOM, 
2010).     
 
4.3.4 Djibouti IV peace process  
 
The TFG organised a National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) in Mogadishu in July 
2007, whose key resolutions included an end to inter-clan violence, ceasefire and 
voluntary DDR, and the return of looted property (UNPOS, 2010). The NRC also urged 
the TFG to conduct census, draft a federal constitution, re-build state institutions and 
prepare the country for a free and fair elections before its mandate expired in 2009. 
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However, the TFG was too weak and lacked internal legitimacy to implement these 
resolutions. Meanwhile, the SCIC leaders „regrouped in Eritrea and Yemen‟ where they 
formed „the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007‟ 
(Kasaija, 2010: 269). The ARS‟s primary objective was to fight the Ethiopians and the 
TFG. It was a broad alliance of some MPs, diaspora and clan groups that supported the 
SCIC and the Islamic movements - the traditional Sufists and the Salafists (ICG, 2008; 
Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).  
 
Thus, the alliance members did not have a common approach towards the TFG or share a 
common interpretation of Islam and the relationship between Islam and the Somali 
statehood (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007). While the Salafists 
viewed the TFG as a lackey of Ethiopians and preferred military approaches, the Sufists 
opted for negotiations with the TFG if Ethiopians withdrew. It is these divergent 
viewpoints that informed the two groups approach to the 2008 UN-sponsored Djibouti IV 
peace process. The Sufi wing of the ARS attended the peace negotiations, while the 
Salafists rejected negotiations and formed an armed movement Hizbul al-Islam (HAI) 
which supported the Al-Shabaab led armed resistance.  
 
The Djibouti IV process comprised of four phases (Kasaija, 2010). Phase I started on 9 
May 2008 and entailed parties submitting their positions and substantive issues for 
negotiation. It culminated with a ceasefire agreement. Phase II started on 1 June and 
involved negotiations over procedural issues, withdraw of Ethiopia and deployment of 
international peacekeepers. Phase III took place on 25 and 26 October and ended with the 
parties signing a Joint Declaration on the Modalities for the Implementation of the 
Cessation of Armed Confrontation. This accord provided for implementation of the May 
ceasefire agreement and deployment of 10 000 ARS/TFG security forces in Mogadishu. 
Phase IV started on 22 November and ended on 25 November when the parties signed an 
agreement that expanded the TFA by 275 seats. The ARS was allocated 200 of these seats 
while 75 went to the civil society including women. These agreements were regarded as 
addendums to the 2004 TFC (Kasaija, 2010). According to Kasaija (2010: 261), the 
Djibouti process „came to a climax at the end of January 2009‟ when the ARS leader, 
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected „the president of the new unity government.‟ 
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Al-Shaabab and Hizbul al-Islam have since then escalated violence and the TFG is 




The aim of this chapter was to highlight the main peace processes for Somalia, to explore 
why they have failed and to interrogate the role of international actors. The chapter has 
shown that the processes have failed to end violence or build sustainable post-agreement 
institutions for four main reasons. Firstly, the peace processes did not built the confidence 
of the internal actors in the emergent institutions particularly the post-agreement state. As 
a result, there is pervasive fear of the emergent state. The roots of this fear lies in the 
character of the state under General Siyaad Barre. Barre‟s brutal repression created „in the 
minds of Somalis the perception of the state not as an instrument of governance but as a 
tool for domination and expropriation by one group over others‟ (Menkhaus and 
Ortmayer, 2000: 215). That is, Barre used the state to extract wealth and resources from 
the population, and as an instrument of clan and ethnic exclusion. Additionally, massive 
violence was perpetrated against the population in the name of the state and by the state. 
That problem was worsened by post-Barre‟s cycles of violence.  
 
Secondly, the peace processes have hardly addressed the question of the looted properties 
and the occupied productive lands in the inter-riverine areas. Indeed, this question is the 
heart of the differences between centrists and federalists. Thirdly, those controlling the 
conflict constituencies and the war economy feared accountability for war crimes and 
human rights abuses, and reparations for the war victims (Hansen, 2003: 65; Menkhaus 
and Ortmayer, 2000: 216). They therefore preferred to undermine the peace processes. 
Fourthly, and this is the main research question of this dissertation, all the peace processes 
have been initiated, supported and financed by external actors and held in foreign cities or 
towns. Thus, the international actors who initiated or opposed these peace interventions 







Chapter 5  




Menkhaus (2004, cited in Kasaija, 2010) has observed that peacemaking efforts in 
Somalia have an identifiable pattern. An external actor initiates a peace process in a town 
outside Somalia. Most Somali actors participate in the process, but their main concerns are 
representation in the negotiations and post-agreement power sharing. The negotiations end 
with a peace agreement that is never implemented and the initiative adds onto the many 
failed peace processes as Somali actors return to their residences in third countries leaving 
the host country with a large bill. Why then do international actors initiate peace 
processes?  
 
Firstly, the trans-border consequences of the prolonged conflict threaten regional and 
international peace and security. These consequences include influx of refugees and other 
forms of migration, proliferation of arms, increase in regional banditry, trans-national 
crimes and human trafficking (Healy, 2011; ICG, 2007, 2006b, 2004b, 2002a; Menkhaus, 
2003a; Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Others are concerns that Somalia has become a 
haven of Islamic extremists and international terrorists and worries over piracy off the 
coast of Somalia (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Elliot and 
Holzer, 2009; Kisiangani, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2003a, 2002a, 2002b). Secondly, the 
prolonged conflict has devastatingly destroyed the internal political, economic and socio-
cultural institutions such that Somalia cannot recover on its own (Besteman, 1996a; Covey 
et al, 2005; Menkhaus, 2003a; Raffaelli, 2007; Weinstein, 2005). The international actors 
are therefore bound by moral imperative to intervene as Somalis share a common 
humanity with the other human societies. The international expression of this moral 
commitment is the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. Thirdly, the international 
actors have third party roles in resolution of the conflict (Covey et al, 2005; Darby and 
Mac Ginty, 2003; Ross, 2000). These roles include facilitation of peace processes and 
mediation, guaranteeing peace agreements and managing escalation of violence through 
militarised interventions as envisioned and practised under chapter VII of the UN charter. 
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Due to state collapse, third parties have an extra burden of providing a vision of the post-
conflict state.  
 
Thus, all the international actors, who have been involved in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace 
processes, have their interests and fears. As President Guelleh of Djibouti (AFP, 2006) 
observed, „there are external and internal factors that come into play, to impose their 
ulterior interests and each time we failed.‟ Exploring these interests holds the key to 
understanding the effect of international actors on the outcomes of post-2001 peace 
processes. Thus, section 5.2 will highlight the interests of the main international players 
who featured in the post-2001 peace processes, while section 5.3 will analyse how these 
interests competed in the peace processes.   
      
5.2 Exploring the interests, fears and priorities  
 
5.2.1 Global, continental and regional institutions 
 
United Nations (UN) 
 
The UN first intervened in Somalia in 1992 in response to the devastating violence, dire 
humanitarian crisis and failed state „threats to international stability‟ (Diel, 1996: 154), As 
the main custodian of international peace and security, the UNSC passed resolution 
S/RES/733 of 1992 which imposed an arms embargo on Somalia. The UN‟s direct 
intervention suffered a blow when UNOSOM I and II fought Somali militias. It therefore 
changed tact and supported regional approaches (Ghebremeskel, 2002). Though the UN 
established UNPOS in 1995, it did not show much interest in Somalia again until 11 
September 2001. In 2002, the UNSC passed two resolutions, S/RES/1407 of 3 May and 
S/RES/1425 of 22 July, which reaffirmed the arms embargo and supported the peace 
process in Kenya. Interestingly, none of the two resolutions identified Somalia as a threat 
to international peace and security. The first resolution that explicitly mentions Somalia‟s 
threat to international peace and security is S/RES/1474 of 8 April 2003. All subsequent 
UNSC resolutions, including the latest, S/RES/1976 of 11 April 2011, have consistently 
mentioned the threat. Similarly, all post-2002 UNSC President‟s statements and the 




We therefore infer that the UN‟s interests in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes range 
from moral imperative to concerns over the trans-border implications of the Somali 
conflict. However, the UN‟s resolutions and statements led to conflicting interpretations of 
its priorities. Their emphasis on Somalia‟s territorial integrity, stabilisation and 
reconciliation was interpreted by some actors as support for building of a strong 
centralised state. The UN also endorsed the building block approach and supported the 
TFIs that emerged from the Nairobi process (ICG, 2008, 2004b; Hansen, 2003, Menkahus, 
2007). This led to the perception that the UN had „forfeited its neutrality in the conflict‟ 
(Menkhaus, 2007: 364).       
  
The African Union (AU) 
 
The OAU‟s role in pre-2001 peace processes was peripheral though it created the 
MCPMR to lead its peace interventions in 1995. The AU, which replaced the OAU in 
2002, has been more involved. Indeed, the AUPSC 6th session of 29 April 2004 endorsed 
the Nairobi process, while the session on 7 February 2005 authorised the deployment of an 
IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) (AUPSC, 2004a; ICG, 2004a; 
Kasaija, 2010). The mission was not deployed.  
 
In June 2006, the AUPSC appealed to the UNSC to authorise the deployment of an 
international peacekeeping mission (AUPSC, 2006a; Kasaija, 2010). The UNSC formally 
approved the request in December 2006. However, Ethiopia‟s military intervention 
delayed deployment. At its 69th meeting on 19 January 2007, the AUPSC authorised the 
deployment of AMISOM to replace Ethiopians. The UNSC supported the authorisation on 
20 February 2007 and stipulated AMISOM‟s mandate as inter alia protection of the TFG, 
peacekeeping and peacemaking. The AUPSC also supported the Djibouti IV process and 
has since then supported AMISOM‟s international forums on implementation of the 
Djibouti peace agreement (ICG, 2011). However, AMISOM lacks capability to enforce 
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peace as it „has no presence beyond some parts of Mogadishu‟15 (Kasaija, 2010: 278). 
Indeed, key Somali actors such as Al-Shabaab view AMISOM as a party to the conflict.16  
 
We thus infer that the AU‟s interests have led to divergent priorities. The moral imperative 
interests have led to emphasis on Somalia‟s territorial integrity, but some have faulted this 
as support for a centralised state (ICG, 2009b, 2009a, 2006a). The AU‟s concerns over the 
trans-border consequences of the conflict have led it to prioritise stabilisation and 
rebuilding of the state, but this has been hampered by lack of a common understanding of 
the post-conflict state. The AU‟s third party intervention interests have emphasised 
conflict resolution aspects such as dialogue and reconciliation, but this been undermined 
by statelessness and an array of spoilers.    
 
Inter-government Authority on Development IGAD) 
 
IGAD did not play any significant role in pre-2001peace processes.17 Until 2002, writes 
Healy (2011: 113), „IGAD played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation beyond 
endorsing Ethiopian and Djiboutian initiatives.‟ The organisation‟s involvement in post-
2001 peace processes was inspired by concerns over cross-border implications of the 
conflict. Nonetheless, facets of moral imperative and third party intervention were evident. 
IGAD‟s effectiveness in the peace processes was, however, hampered by the competing 
interests of its members. 
 
In the Djibouti III process, Ethiopia and Djibouti took divergent positions and thereafter 
supported different factions; Djibouti supported the TNG while Ethiopia supported the 
SRRC (ICG, 2004a, 2003a, 2002a; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). IGAD responded by 
requesting Sudan to host another peace process to reconcile the TNG and the SRRC. 
                                                          
15 IGAD has estimated that 20 000 troops are needed, but the current deployment stands at 9 600, that is, 5 
200 Ugandans and 4 400 Burundians.  
16 AMISOM soldiers have fought Al Shaabab fighters in many battles since 2007. The insurgents have used 
many tactics including road side bombs, suicide bombings and detonating explosives in AMISOM 
compound. According to media reports, fifty three (53) AMISOM soldiers died in battle in March 2011 
alone. For details see: Associated Press (AP), 2011, 53 peacekeepers killed in Somalia offensive, 4 March 
2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110304/ap_on_re_af/af_somalia_peacekeepers_killed  
17 IGAD was founded in 1986 as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification 
(IGADD) to address challenges of drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. Founding members were 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea joined in 1993. The IGADD changed its 
name to IGAD in 1996 and reviewed its mandate to emphasise conflict resolution.  
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Subsequently, IGAD appointed a technical committee comprising of Kenya, Djibouti and 
Ethiopia to lead the reconciliation process, which took place in Kenya from 2002 to 2004 
(ICG, 2004b, 2003a, 2002b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). The 
process was financed by „European development funds‟ (Healy, 2011: 113). But the 
competing interests of IGAD members hampered the organisation‟s stewardship of the 
Nairobi process (ICG, 2004b, 2003a, 2002b). Indeed, the final outcome, the TFIs split into 
two factions: President Yusuf‟s TFG and the Mogadishu group. Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Uganda supported the TFG, while Djibouti and Eritrea sympathised with the Mogadishu 
group. Thereafter, in January 2005, IGAD decided to establish IGASOM to support the 
TFG. The mission was never deployed. Subsequently, IGAD endorsed the Sana‟a, 
Khartoum and Djibouti IV peace processes.   
 
The League of Arab States (LAS) 
 
Somalis are Muslims, but they are not Arabs. Somalia joined the LAS in 1974 and the 
LAS members are Somalia‟s major trading partners. However, the LAS as an institution 
did not initiate any of the pre-2001 peace process. In 2000, the LAS sponsored the 
Djibouti III process, which produced the TNIs – TNG and TNA - whose central goal was 
rebuilding of a centralised state (ICG, 2002a, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; 
Schlee, 2010). The LAS involvement encouraged individual Arab countries to support the 
TNG bilaterally (Schlee, 2010). The TNG failed to function. Thereafter, writes ICG 
(2006b), the LAS‟s role in the Nairobi process was mostly peripheral, but the League 
supported and financed the Sana‟a and Khartoum processes. According to ICG (2002a: 9), 
the League remained consistent and „maintained a unified position on Somalia despite 
natural differences between its members.‟ That is, the LAS stood for Somalia‟s territorial 
integrity and the formation „of a strong central government capable of holding its own vis-
à-vis Ethiopia‟ (ICG, 2002: 9). Thus, the LAS involvement in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace 
processes was motivated by its concerns over the trans-border implications of the conflict, 
its members‟ business interests and desire to control Ethiopia‟s influence in Somalia. It 








ICG (2008: 27) observes that „European states have been mostly content to let the AU and 
the UN‟ lead in Somalia‟s peace processes. According to Schlee (2010), the European 
countries opted to channel their contributions through the EU. The EU, as Raffaelli (2007: 
125) notes, considered Somalia „a key security factor in the Horn of Africa‟ and a part of 
the „regional systems of insecurities [that] feed on one another‟ thus affecting the whole 
region negatively. Thus, the EU‟s prime interests revolve around the trans-border 
implications of the conflict as Europe has become a „home to a growing Somali diaspora‟ 
(ICG, 2008: 27). As Raffaelli (2007: 127) puts it, the EU‟s „primary concern [is] the risks 
of immigration and the obvious links to the Middle East region.‟ The EU‟s other main 
motivation has been moral imperative. „Somalia‟s problems will not be solved by Somalis 
alone,‟ writes Raffaelli (2007: 128), „both for the unique set of problems of a country 
devoid of any institutions for over 16 years and for the meddling of (mainly foreign) actors 
within the regional context.‟ 
 
These concerns led the EU to finance the Nairobi process for two years (Raffaelli, 2007; 
Schlee, 2010). Thereafter, the EU continued providing budgetary support to the TFG, but 
as ICG (2008: 27) has observed, its „interactions with Somali actors … remained 
“decidedly” minimalist.‟ The EU played no role in the Sana‟a and Khartoum processes, 
but it provided the UN-led Djibouti IV process with „€254 million for political 
reconciliation‟ (ICG, 2008: 27). The EU has prioritised stabilisation, dialogue and 
reconciliation so as to prevent Somalia from „drifting into a state of war which would 
enflame the entire region‟ (Raffaelli, 2007: 127).  
   




Djibouti is a very small country – only 23 000 km2 and 750 000 people of which sixty per 
cent are ethnic Somalis. It shares with Somalia a fifty eight (58) kilometre border and 
Islamic religion. The country has been intensely involved in Somalia‟s peace processes; it 
hosted the first two peace conferences in June and July 1991 and the 2000 Djibouti III 
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process (ICG, 2003a, 2002a, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Lewis, 2008). Djibouti was also 
actively involved in the Nairobi process and supported the Sana‟a and Khartoum 
processes. Besides opposing deployment of international peacekeepers (IRIN, 2006), 
Djibouti hosted the 2008 UN-led peace process, which resulted from „a genuine consensus 
that the only way forward was a peace process involving the Islamists and eventually 
leading to a power-sharing accord‟ (ICG, 2008: 23).   
 
Djibouti does not have the necessary economic, military or human resources to engage in 
hard power tactics. It has also received only 14 216 (2%) out of the 658 773 recorded 
Somali refugees as at December 2010 (UNHCR, 2011). Therefore, its involvement in 
Somalia‟s peace processes seems to be motivated by „familiarity with the problems at 
hand and the cultural, social, and historical affinity‟ (Ghebremeskel, 2002: 21). Indeed, 
„ethnic and historical ties … place Djibouti under a special obligation to show leadership 
in Somali affairs‟ (ICG, 2002a: 10). This means Djibouti‟s geographical, historical and 
cultural proximity to Somalia have imposed on it moral imperative and third party 
intervention responsibilities. Djibouti has prioritised rebuilding of a strong central state, 




Geography and history have inextricably tied Ethiopia to Somalia. The two countries share 
a 1,600 kilometres border, have in the past fought two wars and engaged in mutual 
destabilisation through supporting each other‟s armed opponents (Bamfo, 2010; Cliffe, 
1999; ICG, 2009b, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). Yet, Ethiopia hosted the UN-led 1993 Addis 
Ababa and the 1996 Sodere processes. Ethiopia opposed the outcome of Djibouti III 
process and was a major player in the Nairobi process. Indeed, a key highlight of the 
Nairobi process was competition between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt. As Schlee (2010: 
123) notes, „the Ethiopians abstained from diplomatic restraint and played rather open 
power politics.‟ Some have argued that Ethiopia influenced the election of the TFG 
President (ICG, 2004b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Indeed, Ethiopia was on the 




In addition, the Ethiopian military entered Somalia in August 1996 and January 1997, 
targeting Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami, an Islamist organisation which Ethiopia held responsible 
for bomb attacks in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa18 (ICG, 2010, 2006b, 2005b, 2002a; 
Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b; Schlee, 2010). It intervened again in 2006 after the ascendant 
Islamists expressed anti-Ethiopian sentiments and invoked pan-Somali nationalism 
complete with its irredentist claims over the Ogadeen (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; ICG, 
2007a; Menkhaus, 2007; Radio Somaliland, 2006).  
 
We therefore surmise that Ethiopia‟s involvement in Somalia‟s peace processes has been 
motivated by its security and strategic concerns. These include cross-border consequences, 
worries over Somalia‟s irredentism and support to armed insurgencies in the Ogadeen, 
Islamic extremism and terrorism (ICG, 2008, 2007, 2006b, 2005a; Menkhaus, 2007, 
2002a, 2002b). Ethiopia has also been concerned about Eritrea as the two countries have 
engaged in a proxy conflict in Somalia after their 1998-2000 war (Bamfo, 2010; ICG, 
2008, 2007, 2005a, 2004a). As Bryden (2003) sums it, Ethiopia prefers a friendly, 
cooperative government for Somalia that would address its security needs, abandon 
irredentist claims, deny insurgents such as OLF, ONLF and UWSLF operational areas, 
and provide it with a secure access to the sea. These interests have led Ethiopia to 
prioritise a building block approach to state-building and localised approach to 
reconciliation in Somalia (Hansen, 2003; ICG, 2009a; Menkhaus, 2007, 2003a). „The 
building block approach,‟ writes Hansen (2003: 60), „promotes a decentralised state 
consisting of regions that have extensive powers. Puntland and Somaliland are cited as 
examples that have benefitted from such a strategy.‟  
   
Kenya 
 
Kenya shares a 682 kilometres border with Somalia and has a small Somali population. 
The country has received the highest number of Somali refugees; 353 208 (53.6%) out of 
the recorded 658 773 as at December 2010 (UNHCR, 2011). The influx of refugees has 
been worsened by cross-border flow of arms, incursions by armed groups, increase in 
banditry in north-eastern Kenya and transnational crime (ICG, 2002a; Menkhaus, 2003b; 
                                                          
18 Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, addressed a press conference on this question in Addis Ababa on 
27 June 2006 where he emphasised Al Itihaad‟s role in the bombings. For details see: 
http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/Archive/. Accessed 03 May 2011.     
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Schlee, 2010). Additionally, Kenya experienced international terrorist attacks in Nairobi 
and Mombasa in August 1998 and November 2002 respectively. Somalia was suspected to 
have been „a conduit for personnel and materials‟ that was involved in these bombings 
(Menkhaus, 2002a: 118). Indeed, in 2007 and 2008, the US launched air strikes on villages 
in southern Somalia, near the Kenyan border, targeting several individuals whom it 
wanted in connection with the bombings (ICG, 2010, 2008). In addition, all the 
international agencies that work in Somalia including UNPOS and AMISOM have their 
offices in Nairobi. Kenya has also been prosecuting arrested Somali pirates.  
 
Kenya‟s role in the pre-2001 peace processes was mainly supportive. In 2001, IGAD 
requested Sudan to host Somali reconciliation conference, but the TNG objected to Sudan 
leading the process (Woodward, 2004). IGAD then appointed a technical committee 
comprising of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia to lead the process. Kenya chaired the 
committee and hosted the peace process, first in Eldoret and then in Nairobi (ICG, 2002b, 
2004b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). The progress of the conference 
was characterised by disputes among IGAD members (ICG, 2004a, 2002b). Kenya often 
sided with Ethiopia. As ICG (2004a: 4) notes, „Kenya's tendency to align with the 
Ethiopian position encouraged perceptions of Ethiopian dominance of the process and 
attracted increasingly vocal criticism from Somalis and international observers alike.‟  
 
In 2003, however, Kenya‟s „desire to restore an aura of neutrality to the process‟ saw it 
shift its sympathies towards the TNG (ICG, 2004b: 12). This wavering was due to 
Kenya‟s internal politics than its policy shift towards Somalia. Despite portraying itself as 
„an honest and non-partisan peace mediator‟ and a good neighbour (KPPS, 2004), Kenya 
thereafter consistently supported the TFG and its federal vision as well as deployment of 
international peacekeepers (ICG, 2011, 2004b). We can therefore argue that Kenya‟s main 
interest in Somalia‟s peace processes is its strategic and security concerns. Thus, the 
country has prioritised stabilisation, border security and rebuilding of a state that would 









Eritrea does not share border or a population group with Somalia. The number of Somali 
refugees in the country, 4 469 (0.7%) as at December 2010, is extremely small. Eritrea is a 
member of IGAD, but it suspended its participation in 2007 (Reuters, 2007). Eritrea has 
also not initiated or hosted any peace process for Somalia; it has nonetheless been 
engaging Ethiopia in a proxy war (Bamfo, 2010; ICG, 2007, 2006b, 2004a). While 
Ethiopia supported the TFG and rejected the SCIC in 2006, Eritrea supported the Islamists 
(ICG, 2007a, 2006b; Reuters, 2010). When the TFG organised a national reconciliation 
conference (NRC) in September 2007 that attracted the support of the AU and the UN,  
Eritrea hosted a parallel conference in Asmara that ended with the formation of the ARS 
(AFP, 2007; ICG, 2008, 2007a). Thus, Eritrea‟s involvement in Somalia has been 
motivated by its hostile relations with Ethiopia. In December 2009, the UNSC imposed 




Yemen is adjacent to Somalia across the Gulf of Aden. The two countries share 
membership of the LAS and the OIC and Yemen is Somalia‟s biggest trading partner. 
Yemen also has a huge number of Somali refugees, 180 341 (27.5%) as at December 
2010, and serves as a bridge to migrants heading to the Gulf States (IASC, 2008; ICG, 
2008; UNHCR, 2011). According to Menkhaus (2003b), Yemen is among those weak and 
corrupt states that are suspected to harbour international terrorist networks. Indeed, the US 
aircraft carrier USS Cole was attacked in Yemen on 12 October 2000 (BBC, 2000). 
Additionally, a Yemen national, Suleiman Abdalla, who was suspected of being involved 
in the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, was arrested in March 2003 in 
Mogadishu, where he was running a hotel business (Bryden, 2003; ICG, 2005a; 
Menkhaus, 2003b). Meanwhile, Somali pirates have been more active on the Yemen side 
of the Gulf of Aden as shown by Map 5.1 below.  
 
Thus, Yemen has direct interests in Somalia‟s peace processes. While it endorsed the LAS 
interventions in pre-2001 processes, it engaged directly with the Somali actors after 2001. 
In January 2006, Yemen hosted the Sana‟a process that reconciled the TFA speaker and 
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the TFG president. Later in December 2006, Yemen made efforts to facilitate dialogue 
between the TFG and the Islamists (ICG, 2008). After Djibouti IV process split the ARS, 
Yemen pursued reconciliation between ARS-Djibouti and ARS-Asmara factions (ICG, 
2008). Yemen‟s involvement in these peace processes was motivated by moral imperative 
and its concerns over the conflict‟s trans-border consequences. Yemen supported 
rebuilding of a strong centralised state.      
 
 
Map 5.1: positioning and density of piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden. Source: UNOSAT. 





Uganda and Somalia do not share border but they share IGAD and AU membership. The 
number of Somali refugees in Uganda as at December 2010 is only 18 263 (2.7%). The 
country did not play any role in the pre-2001 peace processes, but it actively participated 
in the Nairobi process, strongly supported the emergent TFG and was the first country to 
send troops when the AU and the UN established AMISOM in 2007. According to Kasaija 
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(2010: 268), Uganda advanced three reasons for contributing troops19: „being a member of 
IGAD, AU and the UN. Thus it was responding to a call of these bodies to help stabilise 
the situation in Somalia; the remuneration and associated benefits of Uganda‟s soldiers 
were guaranteed with regard to allowances, feeding, medi-care and compensation in case 
of injury or death; and its participation in AMISOM was to be budget neutral as all the 
costs were covered by the AU.‟ Thus, Uganda‟s involvement was motivated by moral 
imperative. The country has since then been on the firing line of Al Shabaab. Indeed, more 
than forty Ugandan soldiers have died in Somalia, while Al Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for bomb explosions that rocked Kampala in June 2009 (Matsiko, 2010). 
This means concerns over trans-border implications of the conflict have inspired its stay in 




Sudan shares with Somalia membership of the AU, LAS, OIS and IGAD. In the 1990s, 
Sudan‟s Islamists inspired political Islam across the Horn of Africa including Somalia 
(Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b; Woodward, 2004). However, Sudan‟s role in Somalia peace 
processes was peripheral due to its civil wars. Sudan‟s first direct involvement was the 
2006 Khartoum peace process which it facilitated on behalf of the LAS (ICG, 2006b). 
However, the Khartoum process unravelled as radical Islamists won the movement‟s 
internal power contestations prompting Ethiopia to intervene militarily (AFP, 2006; ICG, 
2007a, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007). Sudan had no role in the subsequent Djibouti IV process. 
Thus, the country‟s involvement in Somalia‟s peace processes appears to have been 
motivated by moral imperative, particularly the Islamic connection, and third party 
intervention. As ICG (2006b: 21) notes, „Khartoum‟s Islamist credentials and its warming 
relations with Ethiopia recommended it as a mediator. Its support to AIAI in the early 
1990s also implied an unparalleled degree of access to the militants within the Courts.‟ 
Sudan supported rebuilding of a centralised, albeit Islamic, state in Somalia.  
 
                                                          
19 I discussed this subject with AMISOM‟s force commander, General Nathan Mugisha, and AMISOM‟s 
spokesperson, Major-General Barigye Ba-Hoku, on the side-lines of an AMISOM confidence building 
workshop for troops and potential troops contributing countries (TCCs) in Kampala, Uganda, on 2-3 








Italy has economic interests in Somalia, particularly in banana farming (Gross-Kettler, 
2004). The country supported all pre-2001 peace processes, but some factions accused it 
of partiality (ICG, 2004a; Schlee, 2010). Italy opted to pursue its interests through the EU 
in post-2001 peace processes (ICG, 2008; Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). In the Nairobi 
process, Italy participated in the Somalia International Contact Group20 and co-chaired 
with Norway the IGAD Partners Forum, a group of development partners that were 
financially supporting IGAD (Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Italy also supported the EU 
and the UN‟s positions in the Khartoum and Djibouti IV processes. Italy fears the trans-
border consequences of the conflict; thus, it prioritised stabilisation, dialogue and 
reconciliation.       
 
United States of America 
 
The US did not intervene in 1991 as it was engaged in the first Gulf War, but it led 
UNITAF and was heavily involved in UNOSOM I and II. However, the „black hawk 
down‟ experience dispirited the Americans and they ignored Somalia until 11 September 
2001. Thus, the US post-2001 engagements in Somalia‟s peace processes have been 
informed by its war on terrorism (Bryden, 2003; ICG, 2008, 2007, 2005a; Menkhaus, 
2002a, 2002b, 2003b). According to ICG (2007: 7), the US „provided tepid support for the 
IGAD peace process, which led to the formation of the TFG, but its policies have been 
dominated by military rather than political considerations.‟ While the Americans 
welcomed the Sana‟a process, they also worked with the TFG opponents on counter-
terrorism monitoring and rendition (ICG, 2007, 2005a; Menkhaus, 2007). This counter-
terrorism work led to war between the warlords, who had formed the ARPCT, and the 
SCIC that ended with a decisive victory by the Islamists (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot 
                                                          
20 The International Contact Group was established by the UNSC in June 2006 to „to support the peace and 
reconciliation efforts in Somalia‟. It comprises of EU, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the UK and the US. 
For details please see (http://www.norway-un.org/News/Archive_2006/20060615_somalia/, Accessed 05 
May 2011).  
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and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2007; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). The „rapid defeat of the 
Alliance,‟ writes Menkhaus (2007: 369), „[was] an embarrassing setback for the US.‟  
 
As a result, the US wavered on the Khartoum peace processes. It initially encouraged 
Ethiopia to support power sharing between the TFG and the Islamists, but it later 
supported Ethiopia‟s military intervention in December 2006 (ICG, 2007; Menkhaus, 
2007). As ICG (2007: 7) avers, it went further and „participated in military attacks against 
the fleeing members of the Shabaab and suspected al-Qaeda figures.‟ Subsequently, the 
US declared Al Shabaab a terrorist organisation and then conducted airstrikes in Dhobley 
and Dhusamared in southern Somalia in March and May 2008 which targeted prominent 
Al-Shabaab leaders (ICG, 2008). The 1 May 2008 strike killed Aden Hashi „Ayro‟, an Al-
Shabaab commander who was on the US list of terrorists (ICG, 2008). Though the US 




Egypt share with Somalia membership of the AU, LAS and the OIC. Egypt provided 
Somalia with diplomatic and military support during its two wars with Ethiopia and 
lobbied for it to join the LAS (Osman, 2005). In 1991, Egypt directly supported Djibouti I 
and II peace processes, but it did not support the 1993 Addis Ababa process; instead, it 
supported the factions that boycotted the process (ICG, 2004a; Osman, 2005). In 1997, 
Egypt organised a parallel conference in Cairo instead of supporting the Ethiopian-led 
Sodere process (Healy, 2011; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2004a, 2002a; Osman, 2007). This 
prompted the 6th IGAD Heads of State summit of 1998 to deplore proliferation of peace 
processes (Healy, 2011).  
 
Egypt led the LAS in supporting the subsequent Djibouti III process and its outcome - the 
TNG -, but it opposed Ethiopia‟s positions in the next Nairobi peace process (ICG, 2002b, 
2004a, 2004b; Schlee, 2010). Thereafter, Egypt endorsed the Sana‟a, Khartoum and 
Djibouti IV processes. We therefore deduce that Egypt‟s interest in Somalia‟s peace 
processes revolved around its competition with Ethiopia. This competition has its roots in 
the control of the Nile waters (ICG, 2009a; Osman, 2005). Ethiopia generates eighty six 
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per cent (86%) of the Nile water; but it cannot use it due to colonial Anglo-Egyptian 




Other international actors who have been involved in Somalia include Libya and the Gulf 
States. Libya shares with Somalia membership of the AU, LAS and OIC. In 2006, Libya 
supported the Khartoum process and attempted to reconcile the TFG and the Islamists 
(ICG, 2006b). However,the TFG accused „Egypt, Libya and Iran … of supporting 
“terrorists” in Somalia‟ (ICG, 2006b: 20). Libya‟s efforts seem to have been motivated by 
moral imperative and Gaddafi‟s pan-African agenda. Similarly, the Gulf States share 
membership of the LAS and the OIC with Somalia. These States particularly „Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also have historical 
commercial ties with Somalia‟ (ICG, 2002a: 9). Somalia‟s main exports to the Gulf States 
include livestock products and charcoal while business people in the Gulf States have been 
exporting many goods into Somalia including weapons and printed currency (Gross-
Kettler, 2004). „About 80 per cent of charcoal produced in Somalia is shipped to Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,‟ writes Gross-Kettler (2004: 17). While the Gulf 
States host a substantial Somalia diaspora, Islamic charities, particularly from Saudi 
Arabia, were active in Somalia in the 1990s (Healy, 2011; ICG, 2010, 2008, 2006b, 2005, 
2002a; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b). In all the peace processes, the Gulf States supported the 
position of the LAS and prioritised one strong centralised Somalia. 
      
Table 5.1: Summary of international actors’ interests in post-2001 peace processes 
 
Actor Form of 
intervention 






support to all 
peace 
processes  











b) Reconciliation  
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5.3 Analysis: international actors competition in peace processes  
 
The competition between the international actors took the form of parallel peace processes 
in the 1990s (Healy, 2011; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2004a, 2002a). When „the Sodere process 
threatened to produce a new Somali government,‟ writes ICG (2002a: 8), „Egypt invited 
the key participants to a parallel conference in Cairo and effectively aborted the initiative.‟ 
In post-2001 peace processes, however, the competing interests were masked as 
contestations between three broad ideas on the outcomes of the peace processes and a 




The modernist ideas of the nation-state viewed the end goal of the peace processes as 
rebuilding of the Somali state as it existed prior to January 1991. Modernists, as Hansen 
(2003: 62) notes, „tried to find a solution for the whole of Somalia.‟  Indeed, key 
proponents of modernist ideas such as Djibouti, Egypt and the Gulf States affirmed 
„Somali territorial integrity and the development of a strong central government capable of 
holding its own vis-à-vis Ethiopia‟ (ICG, 2002a: 9). In contrast, post-modern perspectives 
argued that the old Somali nation-state was defunct. Thus, they viewed the final outcome 
as a new Somalia which reflected the post-1991 realities, which included the emergence of 
Somaliland and Puntland. As ICG (2004a: 10) avers, „Ethiopia managed to persuade 
IGAD and its international partners to endorse – over Egyptian objections - a new 
approach to political reconstruction… the building block approach.‟ The third broad idea 
was articulated by the Islamists and sought to blend the Islamic worldview with modernist 
ideas of the nation-state (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2010, 
2005; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b). However, the Islamists split „on two crucial issues, pan-
Somali nationalism and the political utility of clans‟ (ICG, 2010: 4).  
 
The rivalry between proponents of modernist and post-modernist perspectives was intense 
in the Nairobi process while the Islamist viewpoints appeared in the Khartoum and 
Djibouti IV processes. The Nairobi process primarily aimed to reconcile the SRRC and the 
TNG coalitions, but the „IGAD's member states found it impossible to forge a common 
approach sometimes for reasons that [had] nothing to do with Somalia‟ (ICG, 2004a: 10). 
Their rivalry appeared in all aspects from process management, delegates‟ selection, 
negotiation of substantive conflict issues to support for the final outcome.  
 
The Technical Committee (TC) of the IGAD frontline states was responsible for managing 
the process. But phase two was characterised by „unconstrained regional rivalries‟ with 
Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt „working at cross-purposes, backing their respective proxies 
rather than seeking a way forward‟ (ICG, 2002b: 6). Though Egypt was not a member of 
the committee, as it is not an IGAD member, it aggressively pursued its interests behind 
the scenes. As ICG (2002b: 6) avers, „both Ethiopia and Egypt intimated that they [were] 
prepared for renewed fighting if the talks [failed].‟ Additionally, Djibouti often accused 
Kenya of mismanaging the process, while the „Kenyan and Ugandan governments 




Further, the „diametrically opposed interests‟ of international actors led them „to back rival 
factions, thus intensifying clan and political polarisation, undermining opportunities for 
dialogue and ultimately adding another layer to the Somalia conflict' (ICG, 2009a: 4). 
Ethiopia supported the SRRC coalition because it viewed the TNG as „as a stalking horse 
for Arab and Islamic domination of the Horn of Africa [and] a front for al-Qaeda‟ (ICG, 
2002a: 7). Both Kenya and Uganda sided with Ethiopia. In contrast, „Djibouti, Eritrea and 
Egypt were staunch TNG supporters‟ (ICG, 2004a: 11). The Gulf States and the LAS also 
supported the TNG. As ICG (2002a: 9) avers, all LAS members had „a unified position on 
Somalia‟.  
 
In addition, ICG (2002b: 5) has observed that the „stalemate over participation reflected 
the perception‟ that whoever had more delegates „would predetermine the final power-
sharing arrangements.‟ The initial plan was to have equal representation between the TNG 
and the SRRC coalitions. However, „Ethiopia's dominance of the Technical Committee 
and close involvement in conference mechanics such as organisation of the daily agenda 
and screening of delegates produced an increasingly noticeable bias in favour of the 
SRRC‟ (ICG, 2004a: 4). As a result, notes Schlee (2010: 115), „groups which had 
originally been comprised within the fold of the SRRC [got] separate allocations of seats 
so that, as a part of the whole, the weight of the TNG was diminished.‟ This led Diplomats 
from Djibouti, „the TNG's principal patron … to defend their client's interests in the 
Technical Committee triggering heated disputes with the Ethiopians‟ (ICG, 2004a: 4).  
 
Related to this were „disputes over distribution of seats‟ (ICG, 2002b: 4). As more than 
1000 delegates had arrived, instead of the expected 300, international actors wrangled over 
the formula that could be used to reduce them to a manageable number (ICG, 2002b; 
Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). The rivalry „between Ethiopia and Djibouti over 
allocations for their respective Somali clients led to roughly a dozen revisions of the list 
during the first week of November [2002] alone,‟ writes ICG (2002b: 4). The issue among 
Somali delegates was whether representation would be by faction or by clan. Both 
modernists and post-modernists preferred factional representation, but the crux of their 
dispute was the size of the faction representation. As ICG (2002b: 5) notes, „Djibouti and 
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Ethiopia sought to maximise their influence by ensuring that their proxies were 
disproportionately represented.‟ The conference finally settled for the 4.5 formula.  
 
Menkhaus (2007: 363) has argued that the Somali delegates did not „seriously engage on 
key conflict issues‟ in the thematic committees. Nonetheless, the international actors 
competed over resolution of these issues especially the structure of a future state. Ethiopia 
promoted the building block approach because it „advocated support for de facto 
authorities, thus favouring Ethiopia's allies in Somaliland, Puntland, the Hiiraan region 
and the Bay region‟ (ICG, 2002a: 11). Ethiopia also viewed a federal state as the best 
guard against the growth of Islamists. Kenya echoed the same position due to „fear that a 
reunited and prosperous nation might resurrect Somalia's territorial claims‟ (ICG, 2004a: 
11). According to Hansen (2003), IGAD had started promoting the building block 
approach in 1997 and the UN had accepted it.  
 
In contrast, Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt and the Gulf states supported the centralised approach 
to state-building. Djibouti was opposed to Somaliland‟s secession, while Eritrea was 
driven „almost entirely by desire to frustrate Ethiopian ambitions‟ (ICG, 2006b: 20). On its 
part, Egypt argued for a „strong, unified Somali state‟ which would be „an essential 
counterweight to Ethiopian influence in the Horn‟ (ICG, 2002a: 9). Egypt also saw a 
strong central state as the best guard against „Islamist political influence in Somalia‟ (ICG, 
2002a: 10). The LAS supported a centralised state because Egypt provided its leadership 
on Somalia affairs (ICG, 2003a). Meanwhile, the EU financed the process, but its 
„diplomatic engagement…remained low-key‟ preferring to let the AU take the lead (ICG, 
2004a: 12). Interestingly, the UK supported the peace process, but its parliamentarians 
showed in 2004 „a surprising level of bipartisan interest in support and recognition of the 
self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland‟ (ICG, 2004a: 12). On its part, the US contributed 
$350,000 to the Nairobi process, but it was reluctant „to re-engage in Somalia‟ and 
prioritised its war on terror (ICG, 2004a: 13).   
 
Another point of dispute was the question of Somaliland and Puntland. While Puntland 
participated in the Nairobi process, Somaliland declined the invitation arguing that „it 
represents an independent state, not a party to the Somali conflict‟ (ICG, 2003a: 13). Post-
modernists touted both entities as „building block(s) of a future federal Somali republic‟, 
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but the modernists rejected these entities (ICG, 2004a: 1). As ICG (2002b: 10) notes, 
Djibouti had „used the Arta process and the establishment of the Transitional National 
Government as checks on the emergence of Somaliland.‟ Meanwhile, Egypt „campaigned 
energetically against Somaliland independence and viewed creation of “mini-states” as a 
strategy by Addis Ababa and its allies to establish weak client entities incapable of 
challenging its strategic ambitions‟ (ICG, 2009a: 4).  
 
The outcome of the Nairobi process climaxed the competition between international 
actors. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda fully embraced the TFG. For Ethiopia, writes ICG 
(2004a: 11), the outcome was „a political coup de grace‟ as it formally established „a new 
more friendly transitional authority‟. Similarly, the AU and the UN and its lead aid 
agencies such as the UNDP fully supported the TFG arguing that they were supporting the 
„recognised transitional government‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 364).  In contrast, „Djibouti and 
Egypt – supporters of the previous transitional government – [were] less enthusiastic‟ 
(ICG, 2004b: 2). The LAS and the Gulf States also received the TFG coldly. Meanwhile, 
the EU was split with Italy embracing the TFG and the UK urging caution (ICG, 2004a; 
Menkhaus, 2007). On its part, the US adopted „a "slow, measured approach" that [was] 
interpreted as a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the new leadership‟ (ICG, 2004b: 2).  
 
A key consequence of the competition was reinforcing of Somali actors‟ perception of the 
Nairobi process as „a forum for political struggle rather than reconciliation and 
compromise‟ (ICG, 2004a: 7). Hence, they viewed the outcome as a victory for the SRRC 
over the TNG. This led to split of the TFG into two wings. Thus, the Sana‟a initiative was 
an effort to reconcile these two groups. It was short-lived and without competition. 
However, the next Khartoum peace meeting did witness clashing of interests with the key 
issue being the role of the Islamists in the transitional institutions and post-transition state. 
Djibouti, Egypt and the Gulf States rooted for accommodation of the moderate Islamists, 
but Ethiopia objected (ICG, 2010a, 2008, 2006b). Menkhaus (2007: 370) argues that the 
question would have been resolved in Islamists favour had the moderates contained „the 





In the subsequent Djibouti IV process, all international actors agreed that the moderate 
Islamists had a role in the transitional institutions and post-transition state-building (ICG, 
2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Nonetheless, the competition between 
Ethiopia and the Gulf States surfaced as the former felt the UN officials were letting the 
latter, particularly Saudi Arabia, play „a dominant role in the negotiations‟ (ICG, 2008: 
24). Additionally, „inter-Arab/Muslim tensions‟ surfaced with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt being the main competitors (ICG, 2008: 28). According to ICG (2008: 28), Egypt 
was „Ethiopia‟s perennial rival in Somalia‟, while Qatar and Saudi Arabia sought to 
„present themselves as regional peacemakers.‟ As a result, the outcome of the Djibouti IV 
process, an Islamist led unity government, was inherently contradictory for it placed 




The aim of this chapter was to explore the interests of the international actors that have 
initiated, hosted or supported Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes. We started by 
observing that three main arguments underpin international interventions. These are 
concerns over trans-border consequences of the conflict, moral imperative and third party 
interventions. We then interrogated official policy documents, policy research reports, 
news items and academic texts with a view to identify the main interests and analyse how 
these interests interacted in the four post-2001 peace processes. The analysis has shown 
that each actor pursued its own interests, but their desired final outcome groups them into 
three main camps: those who desired a federal Somalia with strong regional governments, 
those who preferred a strong centralised secular state and those who opted for a centralised 
Islamic state. This means that though all international actors pledged commitment to peace 
and recovery in Somalia, their competition led to outcomes that negated the goals of the 









Chapter 6  




Chapter five has shown that international actors have played central roles in Somalia‟s 
peace processes, but their interventions have been characterised by conflicting approaches, 
competing interests and divergent priorities. Broadly speaking, Somalia‟s peace processes, 
as chapter four has argued, have aimed at achieving two broad objectives: ending direct 
violence and re-building functional state and civil society institutions. Thus, while ending 
direct violence has been an important objective, the essence of these peace processes has 
been to address the substantive conflict issues. This includes providing a sound foundation 
for rebuilding of the state and non-state institutions and conflict transformation (Covey et 
al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003).  
 
According to conflict transformation theory, a peace process strives to accomplish these 
broad objectives through transforming the actors in the conflict, their relationships, their 
socio-political and economic structures and the narratives and discourses that premise their 
relationships and identities (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 
2000). Therefore, assessing the impact of the competing international interests on 
Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes and conflict transformation entails evaluating how 
they impacted on the transformation of the Somali actors, their relationships, their 
envisaged structures and the narratives and discourses that have driven the conflict. This 
chapter aims to accomplish this evaluation.   
 
6.2 Transformation of Somali actors 
 
The interest-based negotiation theory presupposes that when conflicting actors engage in a 
peace process, they do not just articulate their own interests, but also try to understand 
their opponents‟ interests (Fisher and Ury, 1983, cited in Ross, 2000; Ramsbotham, 2005). 
The understanding of opponents‟ interests leads to recognition of the legitimacy and inter-
dependence of all interests. It also leads to changes in actors‟ perceptions towards each 
other and towards the conflict and to search for a solution that satisfies all actors‟ interests. 
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The conflict transformation theory refers to this change of perceptions and view towards 
the conflict as actor transformation. Actor transformation is very important in a peace 
process because it creates a sense of legitimacy and ownership of the process and its 
outcomes (Arnson, 1999; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). 
Indicators of actor transformation at the end of a peace process include their acceptance 
that the process has addressed their core issues, resolved the conflict and reached a closure 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). In view of this, we argue that one of the key roles 
of the international actors who were involved in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes was 
to assist in the actor transformation process.  
 
The 2002-2004 peace process in Kenya primarily aimed to reconcile the TNG and the 
SRRC coalitions. The two groups differed on broad range of issues (ICG, 2008, 2002b; 
Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007, 2003a; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). The TNG group 
was based in Mogadishu, envisioned a strong central government, included Islamists in its 
alliance, was opposed to Ethiopia and received support from Djibouti, Egypt, the LAS and 
the Gulf countries. In contrast, the SRRC was based outside Mogadishu, envisioned a 
federal state with strong regional governments, was opposed to Islamists and the Gulf 
States and received support from Ethiopia. Thus, the Nairobi peace process witnessed a 
clash of competing international interests, with Ethiopia and the LAS members being the 
main protagonists (ICG, 2002a, 2002b; Schlee, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a; 2007; 
Woodward, 2004). Though other international actors were involved, their motivations for 
engagements varied. IGAD members such as Kenya sided with Ethiopia while Eritrea 
sided with the LAS members. Meanwhile, the UN and the EU opted to follow the AU 
lead, but the US anchored its position on its war on terror (ICG, 2008, 2004b, 2002a; 
Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004).  
 
These competing interests encouraged the Somali parties to adopt a competitive 
negotiation style whose hallmarks were an inability to recognise each other‟s interests, 
threats, confrontations and endless argumentations (ICG, 2002a, 200b; Kasaija, 2010; 
Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). As a result, notes Menkhaus (2007: 
360), „the assembled Somali delegates made little progress – and demonstrated little 
interest – in addressing conflict issues and routinely violated the ceasefire they had 
signed.‟ The competition also hampered efforts to build confidence among the Somali 
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actors and they took advantage of the rivalry to undermine the international actors‟ 
capacity to exercise leverage (ICG, 2009a, 2004a, 2003a; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). 
To the Somali actors, writes ICG (2009a: 4), „the rivalry was a godsend. They were adept 
at playing off one state against the other.‟ Consequently, they failed to commit to conflict 
resolution and reconciliation. „Foreign actors,‟ avers Menkhaus (2007: 364), were „partly 
to blame for the disastrous outcome of the Kenya peace process.‟ We therefore infer that 
the competing international interests and priorities impeded, instead of assisting, the 
transformation of the Somali actors. The consequences were tragic: split of the emergent 
TFG along the SRRC-TNG lines and violence escalation.  
 
The subsequent Sana‟a reconciliation meeting was aimed at addressing the TFG split. 
Ross (2000) has argued that intervening in a conflict like post-Nairobi Somalia, which was 
characterised by bitterness and cycles of violence necessarily requires a two-step 
approach. The first step entails creating the necessary preconditions for negotiations, 
which seeks to convince groups that their opponents are worth talking to and that it is 
possible to arrive at a settlement that meets each other‟s core interests. The second step is 
the formal negotiation process.  
 
The essence of the Sana‟a process was to explore the necessary preconditions in which the 
two coalitions could go back to formal negotiations. The facilitators identified a working 
relationship on non-disputed legislative matters as an important precondition. The central 
idea was that developing cooperation on legislative matters in the TFA „would produce 
changes which would spill over and produce a shift in the larger conflict‟ (Ross, 2000: 
1003). Thus, notes ICG (2006b:7), the meeting‟s „central promise to convene parliament 
in 30 days‟ in Baidoa „was acceptable to both sides‟ because it gave the TFG president a 
foothold inside Somalia while Baidoa did not threaten the  Mogadishu group. Though the 
cooperation idea was impeccable, actor transformation did not occur as envisaged. As ICG 
(2006b: 8) avers, many members „on both sides of the divided TFG‟ did not embrace the 
Sana‟a accord. Moreover, the Sana‟a meeting was initiated by Yemen and financed by the 
LAS, both supporters of the Mogadishu group. As it turned out, the terms of the Sana‟a 
accord were at odds with the military reality on the ground as they excluded the Islamists, 
the strongest force in Mogadishu at that time (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2006b; 




The rise of the Islamists in June 2006 saw most international actors exert pressure on the 
TFG to initiate dialogue because it „was in a severely weakened position, and was no 
match for the ascendant SCIC‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 369). The Khartoum peace process was 
therefore an effort to reconcile the emergent SCIC and the TFG with a view to share 
power. „The first round of talks,‟ observes ICG (2006b), „achieved little: the parties agreed 
only to refrain from hostilities, to recognise one another and to meet again on 15 July.‟ 
The envisaged rapprochement did not occur partly due to the competing interests of 
international actors. Though the Islamists enjoyed the support of Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, 
Yemen, the LAS, and the Gulf States, their rise rattled other countries such as Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Uganda and the US (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Ibrahim, 
2010; ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007). Indeed, Ethiopia was resistant to the 
proposed power-sharing, while the SCIC scorned the TFG as „an illegitimate puppet of 
Ethiopia‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 376).  
 
Thereafter, attitudes hardened and mutual hostility escalated despite interventions by other 
international actors such as Libya. The Khartoum peace process finally collapsed in July 
when Ethiopia deployed „several hundred‟ troops in Baidoa supposedly to protect the TFG 
from the Islamists (ICG, 2006b: 21). Meanwhile, Eritrea upped the ante by denouncing the 
Ethiopian „invasion‟ and arming the Islamists (ICG, 2006b: 20). Ultimately, the competing 
international interests hampered the transformation of the Somali actors during the 
Khartoum peace process. Subsequently, escalating mutual hostility led to war which ended 
with Ethiopia‟s installation of the TFG in Mogadishu in January 2007.  
 
SCIC‟s defeat split the Islamists into two factions. The radicals - mostly the Al-Shabaab - 
launched a guerrilla campaign against the Ethiopians. The moderates regrouped in 
Asmara, Eritrea, where they formed the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in 
September 2007. The ARS was a broad coalition of Islamists, disaffected MPs and Somali 
nationalists and its main aim was to „fight Ethiopian and TFG forces‟ (ICG, 2008: 10). In 
early 2008, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) proposed peace negotiations 
between the ARS and the TFG, a proposal that was accepted by all key international actors 
(ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Several factors drove the international 
community to advocate dialogue between the TFG and the Islamists: TFG‟s inability to 
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function, escalating insurgency with insurgents controlling most of the territory, 
humanitarian disaster and Ethiopia‟s military woes (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 
2009a). „For the first time,‟ notes ICG (2008: 23), „there was a genuine consensus that the 
only way forward was a peace process involving the Islamists and eventually leading to a 
power-sharing accord.‟  
 
The key objectives of the proposed peace process were to end the insurgency, reconcile 
the TFG with the ARS and install a power sharing government (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 
2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). However, the negotiation proposal split the ARS into two 
factions. Those who supported negotiations moved over to Djibouti (ARS-D), while those 
who preferred military campaign remained in Asmara (ARS-A) (Kasaija, 2008). Thus, 
Eritrea and Djibouti pursued divergent approaches and interests even before the 
negotiations started. The first round of the Djibouti IV process started in May 2008 and 
involved the TFG and the ARS-D. The subsequent rounds split the TFG between the 
president and the prime minister; the TFG president was suspicious of the process while 
the prime minister embraced it. „Relations between [President] Yusuf and [Prime 
Minister] Adde became strained to the point that the Ethiopian government called the two 
together, with [TFA Speaker] Madobe, in Addis Ababa,‟ writes Kasaija (2010: 272).  
 
The process also caused friction between the TFG president and his erstwhile supporters 
such as Ethiopia, IGAD and Kenya (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). As a result, IGAD 
transferred its support to the prime minister, while the TFG president turned to Libya 
(ICG, 2008). Meanwhile, Egypt, the LAS and the Gulf States embraced Djibouti IV, 
which they viewed as an opportunity to get even with Ethiopia and IGAD. On its part, the 
US saw the Djibouti IV process as an opportunity to separate the moderates from radical 
Islamists. Indeed, Djibouti IV climaxed with the election of a moderate Islamist leader 
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as president of the new unity government in January 2009 
(ICG, 2011; Kasaija, 2010‟ Menkhaus, 2009a). Kasaija (2010: 261) notes that the Djibouti 
IV process „resulted in “winners” and “losers”, among the former being Sheikh Sharif and 
Sheikh Madobe, while the latter included President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister 




We therefore infer that competing international interests in the Djibouti IV process 
affected actor transformation in several ways. Firstly, they hampered transformation of the 
Somali actors‟ perceptions and views towards the conflict.  As a result, the moderate 
Islamists viewed the outcome as their victory over the old TFG. Secondly, the competition 
undermined the Somali actors‟ ownership of the process and its outcomes. This is why the 
Islamists have continued to view the federal vision as „a secularist agenda‟ which was 
imposed on them „at the Djibouti talks‟ (ICG, 2011: 6). In other words, the Islamists did 
not recognise the legitimacy of their opponents‟ interests. Thirdly, the persistence of 
violence is testimony that most Somali actors feel that the Djibouti IV process did not 
resolve the conflict. In sum, the Djibouti IV process marked a dramatic shift in 
international perceptions towards Somalia, but it did not transform the Somali actors.     
 
6.3 Transformation of relationships 
 
The interest-based negotiation theory presupposes that understanding each other‟s interests 
improves communication between the warring parties. In turn, the improved 
communication creates spaces for informal and formal constructive dialogues (Ross, 
2000). The improved communication also transforms the actors and leads to building of 
confidence and trust. This means improved communication between the warring parties 
during a peace process leads to transformation of their relationships, which is one of the 
core dimensions of conflict transformation. According to conflict transformation theory, 
third parties play an important role in this relationship transformation as they support the 
primary actors in their quest to repair their relationships, which have been damaged by 
years of hostility and violence (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ross, 2000; Ramsbotham et 
al, 2005). In view of this, we argue that the competing international interests in Somalia‟s 
post-2001 peace processes affected relationship transformation.  
 
The 2002 -2004 peace process in Kenya primarily aimed at repairing relations between the 
TNG and the SRRC coalitions. This reconciliation effort implicitly extended to the other 
smaller factions, individuals and warlords who oscillated between the two main groups. 
The relationship between the two main coalitions was hostile. The TNG faction enjoyed 
close diplomatic and financial relations with the Gulf States. As Menkhaus (2003a: 420) 
writes, the TNG not only received fifty million US dollars from the Gulf States, but also 
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went as far as calling for an „Arab Marshall Plan‟ for Somalia. In contrast, Ethiopia 
viewed the TNG as „an unacceptable threat‟ and provided military and diplomatic support 
to the SRRC factions that „succeeded in blocking TNG efforts from extending its presence 
beyond parts of Mogadishu‟ (Menkhaus, 2003a: 420). Thus, the two coalitions approached 
the peace process in Kenya in October 2002 from diametrically opposed perspectives.  
 
Indeed, the divisions and rivalries among the international actors played a role in the 
disagreements over representation among the Somali actors, which arose mainly due to the 
conflicting formulas that were used to select delegates (ICG, 2002b; Menkhaus, 2007; 
Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). „The most damaging consequence,‟ writes ICG (2002b: 
6), „[was] regional rivalries‟ involving Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt, which were not just 
„backing their respective proxies rather than seeking a way forward,‟ but also had 
„intimated that they [were] prepared for renewed fighting if the talks failed.‟ The effect of 
these rivalries was to worsen the relations between the Somali actors. As ICG (2002b: 4) 
notes, Ethiopia‟s „dominance‟ of the early phases of the conference triggered the 
„formation of a new, anti-Ethiopian coalition - the Group of Eight (G8)‟, which threatened 
to pull out of the talks and to conduct a military action against the SRRC. The final 
outcome, the adoption of the TFC and election of the TFG president, did not heal the 
divisions among Somali actors. Instead, it worsened their relations as it was perceived as a 
win for the Ethiopian supported SRRC coalition and a humiliating loss for the TNG 
coalition (ICG, 2004b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010).  
 
As Menkhaus (2007: 361) observes, those „closely identified with the old TNG were 
conspicuously marginalised in the new government. What was intended to be a 
government of national unity was, yet again, a government based on one of the country‟s 
two main coalitions at the expense of its rival.‟ Indeed, the TFG president „believed he 
could impose a victor‟s peace on his adversaries, by relying on Ethiopian “peacekeepers” 
to outgun them‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 363). The marginalised group responded by forming 
the Mogadishu coalition which opposed the TFG president and his proposal for 
deployment of international peacekeepers. „Yusuf's rivals within the TFG,‟ writes ICG 
(2005a: 3), „including several key ministers, perceived the peacekeeping proposal as a ruse 
the interim president and his Ethiopian allies would use to crush them -- a sentiment 
widely shared within the Hawiye clan.‟ Subsequently, adds Schlee (2010), each group 
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feared entering each other‟s territory in Somalia. In a nutshell, the international actors 
involved in the Nairobi process exacerbated the hostilities between the Somali actors 
instead of repairing their relations. As a consequence, the TFG split and violence escalated 
in the aftermath of the Nairobi process.     
 
The subsequent Sana‟a peace conference aimed to establish a working relationship 
between the two coalitions that emerged from the Nairobi process without necessarily 
transforming their view of the conflict. According to ICG (2006b: 7), the Sana‟a accord 
initially attracted little excitement, but over time it acquired „a life of its own.‟ Both 
groups accepted the proposal to reconvene parliament in Baidoa in thirty days for two 
reasons (ICG, 2006b). Reconvening was being financially supported by the UNDP and 
Baidoa was at that time relatively free of either group‟s influence. To a large extent, 
therefore, the Sana‟a peace accord achieved its objective of forging a working relationship 
as parliament held sessions for the next four months. In June 2006, however, most 
members of the former TNG coalitions opted to side with the ascendant Islamists rather 
than the TFG (ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007).   
 
Thus, the Khartoum peace process was more ambitious as its aim was not just to reconcile 
the TFG and the Islamists but also to generate a power sharing arrangement. Initially, the 
parties agreed to refrain from hostilities, to recognise each other and to meet again on 15 
July 2006 (ICG, 2006; Kaplan, 2010; Kasaija, 2010). Thereafter, hostilities increased 
while both the TFG and the Islamists split over participation in the process. Whilst the 
TFG president resisted the second round negotiations, the TFA speaker embraced the 
Khartoum process (ICG (2006:21). On its part, the SCIC split between the moderates and 
the radicals; the moderates embraced the negotiations while the radicals rejected them 
(ICG (2006b: 21). Efforts by Libya to heal these rifts came to nought. Thereafter, the 
radicals took control of the SCIC and pushed it „into increasingly radicalised positions, 
culminating in a disastrous confrontation with Ethiopia‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 370). The 
Khartoum process collapsed when Ethiopia sent its troops to Baidoa.   
 
We therefore deduce that the competing interests of the international actors, particularly 
Ethiopia and US on one side and the LAS, Djibouti, Gulf States and Eritrea on the other 
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led to intensification of hostilities and ultimately to war. In short, they led to the collapse 
of Khartoum process by worsening the relationships between the Somali actors.  
 
The next effort was the Djibouti IV peace process that aimed to repair relations between 
the TFG and the ARS so that they could share power and implement the transition tasks 
(Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). The first 
round of the negotiations, which took place in May 2008, was characterised by bitterness 
and mutual hostility such that delegates refused to „meet face to face‟ (ICG, 2008: 23). But 
the delegates calmed in the second round in June and even signed an eleven-point 
agreement, which stipulated ceasefire in thirty (30) days and deployment of a 
multinational peacekeeping force within 120 days (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). Nothing 
changed as the ARS-D „had no capacity to deliver‟ and multinational peacekeepers could 
not be deployed within 120 days‟ (ICG, 2008: 23).  
 
Interestingly, the Djibouti IV process soured relations in the TFG especially between the 
president and the prime minister. The prime minister enthusiastically participated in the 
negotiations while the president viewed the process with suspicion (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 
2010). The president even attempted to remove the prime minister and toyed with the idea 
of relocating „the peace talks away from Djibouti‟ (ICG, 2008: 24). The process also 
affected the relations between the TFG president and IGAD members Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Uganda. The IGAD first imposed targeted sanctions on the TFG president and later, in 
December 2008, forced him to resign (ICG, 2011; Kasaja, 2010). Other relations that were 
affected during the Djibouti process were those of Ethiopia and the Gulf States. The crux 
of the problem, as ICG (2008: 24) notes, was the perception by Ethiopia that the SRSG, 
Ould-Abdallah, was allowing the Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, dominate the process.  
 
We therefore infer that the competing international interests affected relationships 
differently during Djibouti IV process. Firstly, the relations between the moderate 
Islamists and the TFG, the UN, IGAD and the AU improved such that the Islamists won 
control of the unity government in January 2009. Secondly, the relations within the TFG 
and between the TFG president and his international benefactors worsened. Thirdly, the 
process exacerbated the hostility between the moderate and radical Islamists. Indeed, the 
subsequent waves of violence including bombings of schools and hospitals have been 
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targeting the moderate Islamists and their AMISOM protectors. Fourthly, the Djibouti IV 
process worsened the relations between the international actors, especially between 
Ethiopia and the Gulf States. 
  
6.4 Transformation of structures  
 
Conflict transformation theory postulates that all the conditions that initially spawns a 
conflict and those that sustains it thereafter have to be transformed in order for durable 
peace to be attained (Botes, 2003; Covey et al, 2005; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 
2005; Ross, 2000). That means transforming a conflict entails re-building social, political 
and economic institutions for the conflict arose in the first place because these institutions 
could not address the causative grievances. Indeed, these structural issues comprise the 
core of the substantive agenda in peace processes (Arnson, 1999; Covey et al, 2003; Darby 
and Ginty, 2003). State institutions in Somalia collapsed in 1991 and their re-building 
since then has had mixed fortunes. Somaliland opted to secede and has built its own 
institutions while Puntland declared semi-autonomy and has been struggling to build state 
institutions. State re-building in the central-south region has failed. Thus, the post-2001 
peace processes have primarily targeted the central-south region though all international 
actors including the UN have recognised Somalia‟s territorial integrity.  
 
The peace process in Kenya was structured into three phases: declaration of ceasefire, 
resolution of substantive conflict issues and power sharing. Negotiations on the 
substantive issues took place in six thematic committees: federalism and provisional 
charter; DDR; land and property rights; economic recovery, institution building and 
resource mobilisation; conflict resolution and reconciliation; and regional and international 
relations (ICG, 2002b; Schlee, 2010). However, writes Menkhaus (2007: 360), the Somali 
delegates were preoccupied with power sharing and „demonstrated little interest in 
addressing conflict issues.‟ The process was also marked by divisions among the regional 
actors and lack of engagement by the other international actors (ICG, 2004a, 2004b; 
Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). Since „IGAD's member 
states found it impossible to forge a common approach,‟ notes ICG (2004a: 10), the peace 
process became a hostage of „the interests of regional powers‟. Nonetheless, the process 
ended in October 2004 with the adoption of the TFC and the establishment of the TFIs 
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whose mandate included preparing a federal constitution, re-building economic 
management institutions (e.g. central bank), and building state institutions at the regional 
and district levels. Other highlights were power sharing during the transition phase and a 
federal structure for the post-conflict state. The Charter gave little guidance on 
reconciliation and the occupied lands and contested properties. It also did not mention 
transitional justice and Somaliland‟s self-determination.  
 
The outcome of the peace process, observes ICG (2004b: 18), „[was] the product of 
regional détente as of a peace deal between Somalis.‟ However, the regional détente 
collapsed as soon as the Charter was signed. Indeed, the TFG fragmented into two 
coalitions. One coalition was led by the TFG president and enjoyed the enthusiastic 
support of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Italy and the AU; the other one was led by the TFA 
speaker and enjoyed the support of Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen and the Gulf States 
(ICG, 2004b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Bamfo, 2010). For the latter 
coalition, the adoption of a federal structure was „an indication that the peace process had 
shifted in favour of Ethiopia and its Somali allies‟ (ICG, 2004b: 4). Further, Italy 
embraced the TFG, the UN was cautious, whilst the UK and the US were „more diffident‟ 
(ICG, 2004b: 18). Actually, the US thereafter opted to work with non-state actors 
including warlords on counter-terrorism monitoring and rendition (Barnes and Hassan, 
2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2005a; Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). 
Ultimately, the TFG failed to function let alone build state institutions.  
 
The competing international interests had other effects. They undermined the Somali 
ownership of the process and its outcomes, and implicitly encouraged those who felt 
excluded to spoil post-agreement state-building and peacebuilding (Barnes and Hassan, 
2007; ICG, 2007, 2006b, 2004b; Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007; Schlee, 2010). 
As ICG (2004a: 15) puts it, the Nairobi process was „devoid of genuine Somali ownership, 
lacked substantive depth and failed to build either trust or a spirit of conciliation.‟ The 
competing interests also intensified mutual hostility between the internal actors leading to 
violence escalation, and prolonged statelessness which spawned other international 
challenges especially piracy (Khalid, 2010; Kisiangani, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009b; Murphy, 




The subsequent Sana‟a peace processes was concerned with the relationships between the 
TFG president and the TFA speaker-led coalitions, while the Khartoum process sought to 
reconcile the TFG and the Islamists. Therefore, the two processes primary focus was 
building confidence and not resolution of the substantive conflict issues. The Khartoum 
process actually did touch power sharing, but it collapsed before it could address the issue. 
Our inference is that the two processes could have impacted on resolution of substantive 
conflicts issues and institutions building if they had achieved their objectives. 
Unfortunately, mounting mutual hostility led to war between the Islamists and Ethiopia 
and ushered in a period of insurgency.  
 
Indeed, it was the combined effects of Ethiopia‟s occupation, escalating insurgency, 
humanitarian disaster and TFG‟s inability to establish functional institutions that shifted 
the international actors‟ thinking in 2008 (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 
2009a). Thus, the four round Djibouti IV peace process was essentially aimed at 
addressing Ethiopian pull-out, cessation of all armed confrontations and deployment of 
international peacekeepers, power sharing and resuscitation of the paralysed transitional 
institutions. However, the process implicitly aimed to address re-building of post-
transition institutions at the national, regional and district levels. Indeed, participating 
parties raised profound issues such as justice and reconciliation, reparations, 
accountability for war crimes, reconstruction and development, which requires structural 
transformation (ICG, 2008; Kaplan, 2010; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2010). That is why 
the three peace accords that were signed during the Djibouti IV process were addendums 
to the 2004 TFC (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a).  
 
As in all previous peace processes, competing interests of the international actors affected 
the negotiations. The main competitors were Ethiopia and the Gulf States. According to 
ICG (2008), Ethiopia had cold relations with the negotiations facilitator - the UN‟s SRSG. 
Ethiopia‟s main concerns were its military withdrawal and the structure of the transition 
and post-transition institutions. Meanwhile, Egypt and the Gulf States saw Djibouti IV 
negotiations as an opportunity to recover what they lost in Nairobi and influence the 
structure of the transition and post-transition institutions. Indeed, notes ICG (2008: 28), 
Saudi Arabia had “set aside $1 billion for [Somalia‟s] reconstruction.‟ Meanwhile, the EU 
financially supported Djibouti IV and lobbied for replacement of President Yusuf with 
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Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Sharif, like 
all Islamists, was hostile to the federal structure envisioned in the Charter (ICG, 2011). On 
its part, the US supported the peace process and at the same time pursued its war on terror. 
Had the negotiations failed, writes ICG (2008: 27), the US planned to „pursue a 
“containment” policy to stop extremism from spreading beyond Somalia while dropping 
food relief into the country from a plane.‟  
 
We thus infer that these competing interests and priorities did contribute to the post-2009 
paralysis of the transitional institutions. For an Islamist-led TFG has not identified with 
the federal vision let alone build federal institutions stipulated in the charter (ICG, 2011). 
Similarly, it has no capacity to pursue substantive conflict issues such as exclusion or 
implement reparations for its Islamist vision is exclusionary (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; 
Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2011, 2010, 2008; 2006b; 2005; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007).  
 
6.5 Transformation of narratives and discourses  
 
Parties to a conflict usually have different narratives that explain their attitudes, 
behaviours and contradictions. These narratives also underpin their relationships, the 
strategies they adopt during peace processes and their preferred post-conflict policies and 
institutions. Therefore, a fundamental component of conflict transformation is reframing 
of narratives. As Ross (2000: 1020) avers, conflicts are „social and cultural constructions‟ 
whose meanings are transformed when people „change their knowledge [and] 
perceptions‟. Thus, reframing of narratives, as Ramsbotham et al (2005: 288) notes, assists 
the conflicting parties „overcome prejudice and misunderstanding and to build trust‟. The 
essence of narrative reframing is to transform the actors, their relationships and ultimately 
foster reconciliation at the top leadership, middle-range and grassroots levels (Botes, 2003; 
Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005). Thus, a key indicator of the success of a peace 
process is the extent to which it contributes towards reframing of narratives (Covey et al, 
2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005).   
 
The Nairobi peace process involved two major parties, the TNG and the SRRC, and many 
fringe actors. Two broad categories of narratives predominated in the peace process: pre-
2001 and post-2001 narratives. The pre-2001 narratives focused on the causes of the 
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conflict and state collapse, persistence of warfare and anarchy, and conflict intractability. 
The narratives on the causes of the conflict emphasised political, economic and cultural 
exclusion. These narratives spawned contrasting primordial, patrimonial and identity 
construction discourses, which sought to explain the massive violence that ravaged 
Somalia (Besteman, 1999b, 1996a, 1996b; Hansen, 2003; Lewis, 2008, 2004; Samatar and 
Samatar, 2005). Indeed, the convergence between exclusion, patrimonialism and ethno-
cultural identity largely accounts for the intractability of the conflict. As Menkhaus 
(2003a) notes, these narratives depicted the conflict as zero-sum with winners and losers. 
That explains why themes such as centralism vis-à-vis federalism, traditional structures 
vis-à-vis modern civil society, proportional representation, group and minority rights 
dominated negotiations in the earlier peace processes (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; 
Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). Additionally, it is discourses on exclusion and clan 
domination that premised secessionist tendencies whose main expressions were 
Somaliland‟s independence and Puntland‟s semi-autonomy.  
 
The narratives on the warfare persistence emphasised warlordism and war economy 
(Gross-Kettler, 2004; Hansen, 2003; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2006b, 2003; 
Schlee, 2010). These narratives gained currency after UNOSOM II‟s withdrawal when 
warfare became decentralised to lower clan lineages (Menkhaus, 2003a). Besides raising 
discourses around peace and security, warlordism spawned themes such as individual vis-
à-vis clan accountability (Hansen, 2003; Menkhaus, 2003a). Hansen (2003: 67) 
appropriately argues that warlords derived their power partly from controlling resources 
and instruments of violence and partly „from patrimonial relations with the traditional clan 
structure‟. The ascendance of Islamist discourses in the late 1990s was a reaction to 
warlordism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2005; 
Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b). Indeed, the 2000 Djibouti III process had three high points 
(Hansen, 2003; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Samatar and Samatar, 2005). It sought to 
shift power from the warlords to professional politicians, civil society and traditional 
structures. It returned the old discourses, particularly centralism vis-à-vis federalism, to 
the centre stage of peace negotiations. And it ushered in Islamism vis-à-vis secularism 
narratives into the peace processes. Therefore, centralism vis-à-vis federalism, Islamism 
vis-à-vis secularism and Somalia‟s Islamists linkage with international terrorism were the 




The main actors in the 2002-2004 peace process in Kenya were the TNG and SRRC, the 
official and unofficial outcomes of Djibouti III. The TNG‟s main narrative stressed 
centralism and accommodation of Islamism. The SRRC‟s primary narrative emphasised 
secular federalism. Some groups such as the RRA prioritised minority land rights within 
secular federalism (Eno et al, 2010; Hansen, 2003; ICG, 2002a). Most warlords oscillated 
opportunistically between the main narratives (Hansen, 2003; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 
2007; Schlee, 2010). Thus, by seeking to reconcile the two main factions, the Nairobi 
peace processes implicitly aimed to draw a common narrative from very divergent 
narratives. Moreover, participants initially argued over representation in the process; some 
opted for representation by larger coalitions while others rooted for clan delegates (ICG, 
2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Schlee, 2010). At the heart of their disagreements were two 
contrasting discourses. The transformative discourse, which argued for a coalition 
representation, advanced the view that the peace process needed to expand the boundaries 
of the political community beyond the clan identity. The primordial discourse sought to 
confine the political community within the boundaries of the clan. The conference finally 
settled for the 4.5 formula, meaning that it gave primacy to the primordial discourse (ICG, 
2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004).  
 
We therefore infer that one of the core tasks of the international actors who initiated the 
peace process was to reframe the narratives and discourses with a view to transform the 
Somali actors and their relationships. But their competing interests and priorities 
hampered this aim. Instead, those actors such Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, IGAD, AU and 
the EU, particularly Italy, who ardently supported the emergent TFG, reinforced its main 
narrative which portrayed the federal charter as a tool for national reconciliation. In 
contrast, actors such as Djibouti, Yemen, Egypt, the LAS and the Gulf States, who sided 
with the Mogadishu group, reinforced that coalition‟s main narrative which portrayed the 
final outcome as a humiliating defeat for the centrists. The Nairobi peace process therefore 
failed to reframe the narratives and to produce a unifying one. The results of this failure 
were the subsequent win-defeat bitterness, hostility and violence escalation.   
 
The subsequent Sana‟a reconciliation meeting (as noted in section 6.4) was aimed at 
forging a working relationship between the TFG president and the TFA speaker. Its central 
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focus was cooperation on non-disputed legislative matters; it was in essence a confidence 
building narrative. To an extent, Yemen made efforts to reframe the narratives when it 
focused the Somali actors on unifying legislative matters. This reframing enabled the TFA 
hold sessions for four months, but the narrative collapsed when the Islamists took over in 
June 2006.  
 
Similarly, the Khartoum process aimed to reconcile the TFG and the ascendant Islamists, 
but this process had to grapple with exclusivist Islamist narratives ((ICG, 2006b; Kasaija, 
2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). That is, while the federal charter remained the core tool of the 
TFG, the SCIC‟s main narratives were Islamism, centrism and pan-Somali nationalism 
(Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 
2005; Menkhaus, 2007). The core Islamist narrative depicted Islamism as a „refreshing 
alternative to the country's warlords and clannish political elites‟ (Bryden, 2003: 14). But 
contrasting discourses existed within Islamism, especially over the questions of pan-
Somali nationalism and the political relevance of the clan (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 
2010, 2005b). Nonetheless, Islamism and pan-Somali nationalism worried many 
international actors, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya and the US (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; 
Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2008, 2006b; Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007). As Menkhaus 
(2007: 376) avers, „international diplomatic circles [hoped] that the moderate wing of the 
Islamists could be brought into dialogue with the TFG with the aim of negotiating a more 
inclusive TFG cabinet.‟ That is, the international actors gave prominence to the moderate 
discourse of Islamism. The premising idea was to focus on unifying issues in a power 
sharing arrangement between the TFG and moderate Islamists in order to build 
confidence. No confidence was built.  
 
Instead, writes ICG (2006b: 20), some argued that „Khartoum [was] fronting for Egypt, 
which has historically competed with Ethiopia for influence over the Somali peninsula.‟ In 
July 2006, TFG Prime Minister Geedi lashed out at Egypt, Libya and Iran, accusing them 
of supporting “terrorists” in Somalia.‟ That is, exploiting Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry, the TFG 
espoused a narrative that aimed at delegitimising the Islamists by linking them with 
international terrorism. In return, the SCIC radicals sought to delegitimise the TFG by 
portraying its links with Ethiopia as betrayal of Somali nationalism (Bamfo, 2010; ICG, 
2007, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007). Moreover, Ethiopia objected to negotiations with the 
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Islamists, whom they argued had „been infiltrated by al-Itihaad, and a potential entry point 
to the region for al-Qaeda‟ (ICG, 2006b: 19). Meanwhile, the US initially supported 
engagements with the moderates, but the SCIC stonewalled the Americans „on the issue of 
safe haven for al-Qaeda‟ undercutting their „efforts to promote dialogue and restrain 
Ethiopia‟ (Menkhaus, 2007: 378). Later in the year, the US referred to SCIC‟s top 
leadership as „extremists‟ and their movement as „controlled‟ by al-Qaeda (ICG, 2007: 4). 
The Khartoum process ultimately failed to reframe any narrative including the dominant 
terrorism narrative, which underpinned the subsequent war between the TFG and Ethiopia 
on one side and the SCIC on the other.      
 
The terrorism narrative was actually not far from the surface during the next UN-led 
Djibouti IV peace process, but the international opinion had considerably shifted in 2008. 
At least, all international actors supported dialogue with the Islamists (ICG, 2011, 2008). 
The TFG‟s main narrative during the process emphasised its international recognition, 
need for multinational force to protect the transitional institutions, acceptance of the 
federal charter as the core tool of national reconciliation and renunciation of violence by 
their opponents (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). The Islamists‟ main narrative stressed their 
domestic legitimacy, respect for Somali nationalism and statehood, Ethiopia‟s pull-out, 
reparations and accountability for war crimes, re-negotiation of the transitional charter and 
deployment of a predominantly Muslim multinational force (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 
2010). Anchoring these broad narratives were contrasting discourses. The TFG‟s central 
discourse offered a secular, federal structure as the best option for re-building Somalia, 
guaranteeing minority land and property rights and addressing the complexity of fear, 
which had been induced by „centralised and predatory exercise of power of the past‟ 
(Woodward, 2004: 476). The core Islamist discourse offered the Islamic identity as the 
alternative to clan identity, argued all rights could be guaranteed in a centralised pan-
Somali Islamic state and dismissed a federal structure as an external strategy to prevent the 
emergence of a strong Somali state (ICG, 2011).  
 
On their part, most international actors acknowledged that the TFG as then constituted was 
an „inadequate instrument for national reconciliation and political reconstruction‟ and 
needed to be reformed (ICG, 2007: 11). They therefore supported power sharing between 
the Islamists and the TFG. Though their competing interests surfaced in the Djibouti IV 
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peace process, most international actors articulated the cooperation narrative for different 
reasons (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Ethiopia was frustrated by its 
military losses, failure of the TFG to establish functional institutions, failure of other 
African states to contribute troops to AMISOM and US‟s lack of leverage over AU. The 
US felt that the moderate Islamists could be accommodated, but it prepared a plan B.  
 
The EU was concerned about the Somali diaspora in the European countries and argued 
that involving the moderate Islamists would eventually change the perceptions of the 
radicals. The Gulf States had their internal competition, but most of them hoped they 
could use the process to influence re-structuring of the transition institutions and persuade 
radicals to pursue peace negotiations. Meanwhile, Eritrea continued supporting the al-
Shabaab radicals forcing the UNSC to impose sanctions through resolution S/RES/1907 of 
23 December 2009. In short, there were efforts to reframe narratives during the Djibouti 
IV peace process. But they were not successful as an Islamist-led TFG has been „unable to 
expand its authority beyond Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, seat of the presidency‟ (Kasaija, 
2010: 278). In contrast, the al-Shabaab radicals have escalated the insurgency and control 









International actors played central roles in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes, whose 
core aims were to end direct violence, address structural and cultural violence, and lay the 
foundation for long-term peacebuilding. Achieving these objectives required conflict 
transformation, which, as the theory postulates, entails transforming the actors, their 
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relationships, their socio-political and economic institutions, and the narratives and 
discourses that premise their interactions and identities. Therefore, assessing the impact of 
international actors on Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes entails evaluating the extent 
to which their interests and priorities contributed to conflict transformation. The aim of 
this chapter was to evaluate how the interests and priorities of international actors, who 
were involved in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes, impacted on their outcomes and 
conflict transformation.  
 
The chapter has shown that competing interests and priorities of the international actors 
undermined Somali actors‟ transformation, frustrated their relationships‟ transformation 
and impeded building of transitional and permanent state and non-state institutions. The 
chapter has also shown that competing interests and priorities of the international actors 
stymied transformation of the discourses and narratives that reproduce violence. Indeed, 
these interests and priorities reinforced the discursive privileges accorded to the narratives 
and discourses.  The results were a hardening of the attitudes and views that did not regard 
the peace processes as viable alternatives to armed confrontations. Thus, the international 
actors in fact played a central role in perpetuating and exacerbating the conflict in 


















Chapter 7  




International actors have played a dual role in post-2001 Somalia; they have initiated 
peace processes and at the same time exacerbated the conflict. Their motivations for 
involvement in Somalia‟s peace processes varied. While some were motivated by 
concerns over the trans-border implications of the state collapse and violent lawlessness, 
others were moved by moral and humanitarian imperatives, and others were motivated by 
third-party intervention interests. Moreover, warfare persisted regardless of the 
international actors‟ motivations. According to Menkhaus (2003a), misinformed external 
diplomacy, incompetent mediation and external conspiracy were key contributors to the 
failure of the peace processes and persistence of warfare. This study has, however, argued 
that rather than being misinformed, incompetent and conspiratorial, the external 
diplomacy in post-2001 peace processes was hampered by competing interests, the 
mediation efforts were undermined by contending priorities and actions by their fears.  
 
Therefore, the first objective of this study was to map the interests, fears and priorities of 
the international actors. Premised on the interest-based negotiation theory, the mapping 
formed the basis of the second objective, which was to explore how these interests, fears 
and priorities of international actors affected the outcomes of the post-2001 peace 
processes. The analysis of the impact on the peace processes was based on the conflict 
transformation theory, chosen because Somalia‟s collapsed state status requires conflict 
transformation as it is characterised by „uncompromising political aims, capacity for 
militant extremism, lawless rule and a criminalised political economy‟ (Covey et al, 2005: 
15). The third objective of this study was to link the mapped interests, fears and priorities 
and their impact analysis with the broader peacemaking praxis through identifying the 
learned lessons. An additional aspect of this objective was the need to develop a peace 
studies understanding of the conflict in Somalia. This chapter will summarise the main 
findings, which have been discussed extensively in chapters five and six, and highlight the 
learned lessons. It will then present a brief peace studies understanding of the conflict in 




7.2   Summary of the main findings 
 
7.2.1 Competing interests, conflicting outcomes 
 
Most studies on international interventions in peace processes tend to focus on negotiation, 
mediation, peace agreements and applications of diplomatic instruments such as 
incentives, sanctions and pressures. This study deviated from these general trends and 
focused on how the interests and fears of the international actors, which have been 
involved in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes, affected the outcomes. The study started 
by explaining that assessing the impact of international actors in peace processes entails 
exploring how their interests affected the transformation of the Somali actors, their 
relationships, the structures in which they interact and the narratives and discourses that 
underpin their interactions. The study then identified the categories of international actors 
that intervened in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes, analysed how they competed in 
the peace processes and inferred that each actor pursued priorities which were primarily 
aimed at satisfying its interests and assuaging its fears. Indeed, notes Regan (1996), third-
parties intervene not just to end direct violence but also to secure their own interests.  
 
All the international actors that were involved in the Nairobi peace process, the Sana‟a 
reconciliation meeting, the Khartoum peace meeting and the Djibouti IV peace process 
pledged their commitment to conflict resolution, peace and reconstruction in Somalia. 
However, their competing interests and contending priorities led to a diametrically 
opposed outcome: non-transformation of the actors and the conflict and violence 
escalation. Scholarly studies on peace interventions show that third-parties intervene not to 
prolong a conflict, but to end it „on terms favourable to the intervener‟ (Regan, 1996: 341). 
This means the competing interests and contending priorities of the international actors 
who were involved in the various peace processes had strong undercurrents which affected 
their outcomes in many ways. These include impeding Somali ownership of the processes 
and hampering the transformation of the actors, their relationships, structures, narratives 





7.2.2 Lessons learned 
 
The international actors‟ interventions in Somalia‟s post-2001 peace processes raise many 
valuable lessons around five broad themes. The first theme concerns issues in peace 
negotiations such as inclusion and exclusion, representation, legitimacy, timing, power 
asymmetries and third-party biases. Three of the four post-2001 peace processes were 
vexed by questions over representation and legitimacy of the participating Somali actors 
(see chapter six). Emerging lessons here are the importance of managing tensions between 
inclusive and exclusive approaches in a peace process and the pitfalls of competing 
international actors dictating the internal parties that would be included or excluded in 
peace negotiations. Other lessons concern the legitimacy of the negotiators and the 
dangers of third-party bias in a peace process.  
 
The second theme centres on the balance between conflict resolution and state-building. 
Power sharing, which was a central aim of all the four post-2001 peace processes, was 
premised on the notion that a unity government would spearhead both state-building and 
conflict resolution. Some analysts have criticised the international actors for emphasising 
state-building and down playing conflict resolution. Where the state has collapsed, 
however, rebuilding the legitimacy, authority and effectiveness of the state institutions is a 
fundamental requirement of conflict resolution. The challenge is how to strike a balance 
between the two.  
 
The third theme is about resolution of an intractable conflict that is characterised by 
destructiveness, mutual mistrust and deep individual and community pain and bitterness. 
Ross (2000) argues that resolving such a conflict requires a two-step approach: developing 
the necessary pre-conditions for negotiations and the formal negotiations. According to 
Menkhaus (2007: 360), the Nairobi process improved „over past peace processes in 
Somalia‟ because it shifted the parties from „crude cake-cutting exercises‟ to 
reconciliation, but the Somali delegates failed to engage „on key conflict issues‟. We have 
explained that the delegates failed to address the conflict issues because the international 
actors, who initiated the process, glossed over conflict intractability and thus failed to 




The fourth theme concerns approaches to post-agreement state-building. The Nairobi 
process adopted the building block approach, which is still the basis of the current unity 
government. „The building block approach,‟ writes Hansen (2003: 60), „promotes a 
decentralized state consisting of regions that have extensive powers…. This approach 
suggested that Somalia should be federalized and that peace must be created locally before 
it can be achieved centrally.‟ The opponents of the building block approach, who were 
mostly the TNG coalition, clamoured for a centralised state. According to Menkhaus 
(2007: 363), this group was vehemently opposed „to federal and confederal models for 
Somalia‟ because it operated „on the unspoken assumption‟ that its control of the capital 
city, Mogadishu, gave „it the right to rule over the entire country.‟ International actors 
such as Djibouti, Yemen, Egypt and the LAS also supported a centralised state.  
 
Two lessons emerge here. Firstly, the competing interests of the international actors 
prevented the Somali delegates from engaging seriously on the merits and demerits of the 
various state-building models. „The debate over various approaches (federalism, 
regionalism and building blocks),‟ ICG (2009a: 4) sums it, „occurred against [the] 
backdrop of regional competition, warlordism and political opportunism, with little 
intellectually rigorous argumentation to convince the public.‟ Secondly, the international 
actors implicitly encouraged a zero-sum view of the conflict instead of encouraging 
Somali actors to understand and accept the legitimacy and inter-dependence of all 
interests. Menkhaus (2007: 363) believes that the international actors fuelled „the impulse 
to try to marginalise rather than integrate the opposition in a transitional government‟ and 
the desire to „impose a victors‟ peace‟.  
 
The linkage between Somalia‟s conflict discourses and global discourses on terrorism is 
the fifth theme. Many international actors have linked stateless Somalia with international 
terrorism despite evidence that, unlike Afghanistan, Somalia is „decidedly less welcoming 
for non-Somalis with ulterior political agendas, as external Islamic movements have 
learned‟ (Menkhaus, 2002a: 120).  Linking Somalia‟s conflict with international terrorism 






7.3  A peace studies understanding of the conflict and peace processes 
 
Academic studies of the causes and the persistence of the warfare in Somalia have 
advanced various interpretations, narratives and discourses. Most studies that have focused 
on the causes of the conflict and state collapse have employed the realist theoretical 
frameworks while others have employed the anthropological structural-functional and 
identity construction approaches (Besteman, 1996a, 1996b; Lewis, 2008). The studies that 
have dwelt on warfare persistence, war economy and warlordism have been premised on 
greed-grievances theories. There have also been studies on Islamism, terrorism and lately 
piracy. Most of these studies have combined realist approaches with new wars 
frameworks. In general, therefore, peace studies theoretical perspectives have been 
peripheral in Somali studies. We advance in this section a peace studies theoretical 
understanding which links all the perspectives that anchor the various interpretations, 
narratives and discourses.  
 
7.3.1 The primordial narrative 
 
Chapter two explained three broad narratives which have dominated debates about the 
causes of the conflict and state collapse in Somalia. These three narratives arise from 
different theories of conflict. The primordial narrative portrays Somalia „as an ethnically 
homogeneous society broken down into kinship units based on segmentary opposition‟ 
(Besteman, 1996b: 579). According to this narrative, traditional enmity between these 
kinship units (clans) are the main cause of the conflict and state collapse in Somalia. That 
means the primordial narrative is essentially premised on the biological theories of war, 
which attribute conflicts to the human nature. That human nature in Somalia is presumed 
to be clan relations. Additionally, when we situate the primordial narrative within conflict 
transformation discourse, we note that the narrative emphasises actors and downplays the 
role of the structures. The „emphasis on unchanging clan identities in explaining Somali 
society,‟ argues Besteman (1996a: 123), „reflects the persistence of discredited 
assumptions characteristic of structural-functional anthropology – assumptions that 




Therefore, the primordial narrative has major weaknesses in that it ignores the dynamism 
and creativity of the human society. Indeed, the narrative downplays the role of structural 
violence in Somalia, which was the main cause of the conflict and state collapse, and 
freezes the cultural violence in ancient history. Yet, as UNESCO‟s 1986 Seville Statement 
declared, „biology does not condemn humanity to war‟; on the contrary, „humanity can be 
freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to 
undertake transformation tasks needed now and always.‟ These transformation tasks in 
post-2001 Somalia entails transforming the perceptions of the internal actors, their view of 
the conflict, the structures and the narratives that reproduce violence.  
 
7.3.2 The instrumental narrative 
 
The instrumental narrative, on the other hand, attributes the prolonged conflict to 
leadership and governance failures. According to Samatar (1992), the elite 
instrumentalised clan identities as they competed for control of the state and its resources. 
This argument resonates with the theories of war, which emphasise the social, political and 
economic roots of conflicts. As Mead (1940: 402) puts it, „warfare is the inevitable 
concomitant of the development of the state, the struggle for land and natural resources of 
class societies springing not from the nature of man, but from the nature of history.‟ The 
argument here is that Somalia‟s conflict has its roots in the organisation of the post-1960 
state and the country‟s structural violence. Indeed, writes Besteman (1996b: 580), „the 
dissolution of the Somali nation-state is rooted in the political economy of class and 
regional dynamics, played out in an idiom of kinship.‟ Further, when situated within the 
conflict transformation perspective, the instrumental narrative emphasises the structure of 
interaction. As Besteman (1996b: 591) writes, „Somalis have killed each other not because 
they are unrelated but because they are struggling for power and control over resources in 
a highly militarized atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust, domination and terror.‟  
 
This struggle for power and resources amidst bitter hostilities links discourses on conflict 
causes with those on conflict persistence particularly discourses on war economy and 
warlordism. These include the greed-grievance discourse which basically contrasts 
personal greed with political grievances as underwriters of warlordism. As Gross-Kettler 
(2004: 5) puts it, warlords „control their own militias and operate on a strictly economic 
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basis, whereby the use of violence is simply a form of conducting business.‟ Hansen 
(2003: 66) while acknowledging „warlordism as an economic system‟ argues that it was 
not all about individual greed in Somalia as some of the business proceeds were 
redistributed to traditional leaders „through the patrimonial channels in the clan system‟. In 
short, warlords, like the elite of Barre era, instrumentalised the clan identities. That means 
the instrumental narrative has roots in of the theories of conflict that underlines changes in 
the socio-economic and political structures as an important component of peace processes. 
 
7.3.3 The identity construction narrative 
 
The third main narrative, the identity construction, emphasises „shifting cultural 
constructions of difference such as race, language, and status, and on economic divisions 
such as occupation and class‟ (Besteman, 1996a: 123). Emphasising the dynamism of 
human society, the narrative identifies other social identities such as social class, 
occupation and religious identity which transcend clan identities. The narrative, therefore, 
resonates with peace studies discourses that derive their explanatory power from 
theoretical frameworks such as relative deprivation and social identity theories. That is, 
from a peace studies perspective, we would argue that many groups in Somalia, 
particularly the inhabitants of the inter-riverine region, were relatively deprived of 
economic and political power on the basis of their social identity (Besteman, 1996a, 
1996b; Eno et al, 2010; Webersik, 2004). Indeed, the minorities of the inter-riverine region 
were not just the main victims of the violence and famine in the early 1990s, but also they 
have been deprived of their livelihood means by war persistence because their lands have 
been occupied by other groups. It is this relative deprivation that partly accounts for the 
pervasive fear of the return of a centralised state.  
 
When viewed within the conflict transformation perspectives, the construction narrative 
stresses not just the structures but also the relationships, the context in which these 
relationships are formed as well as the discourses that underpin identities‟ formation. As 
Besteman (1996a: 125) affirms, a constructed „superior-inferior‟ narrative determined 
relationships and participation in the state. Those groups that were profiled to be of „lower 
status in the national arena‟ due to combined factors of „language, racial construction, and 
occupation‟ were then marginalised „from national governments since the 1970s‟ 
108 
 
(Besteman, 1996a: 125). Concurring with this view, Webersik (2004: 517) argues that the 
boundary between ethnic and non-ethnic Somalis „was based on racial stereotypes‟; that is, 
„major lineage groups used imagined differences to maintain their power in the southern 
agricultural regions. In turn, groups who felt excluded from economic and political life 
took up arms to be heard.‟ Thus, the construction narrative, which critiques the discourses 
that legitimised exclusion and violence against some communities, resonates with the 
relative deprivation, social identity and conflict transformation theoretical perspectives. 
Accordingly, the narrative rightly posits that peace processes in Somalia ought to have 
transformed narratives and discourses that have consistently reproduced violence.   
  
7.4   Recommendations 
 
The learned lessons points to several policy recommendations. Firstly, actors such as the 
UN and the AU have better chances of success in mediating the conflict as they can 
synchronise the interests of their members. We therefore recommend that the AU 
supported by the UN should explore mechanisms of harmonising the interests of 
Somalia‟s neighbours, and subsequently lead in the peace processes. For example, the AU 
should help Ethiopia and Djibouti see their role in Somalia as complementary rather than 
competitive. Similarly, the UN and the AU should assist Egypt see that in the long term, it 
needs Ethiopia‟s cooperation on the question of Nile Waters. Such synchronisation will 
lead to cooperation rather than competition in Somalia‟s peace processes.  
 
Secondly, all the approaches to post-2001 peace processes ignored the intractability of the 
Somali conflict. An intractable conflict requires a phased approach with the first phase 
focusing on harnessing of the necessary preconditions and building of confidence. The 
international interveners should therefore adopt a phased approach with the first phase 
focusing on unifying matters. The international actors should only initiate a formal 
negotiation process once they have built enough confidence among the Somali parties.    
 
Thirdly, Somalis have to address their foreign dependence syndrome. All the post-2001 
peace processes were initiated and financed by international actors. Similarly, the 
transitional governments emerging from these processes were financed by international 
actors and defended by foreign troops. The Nairobi process and the TFG were financed by 
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the EU. The Sana‟a process was financed by the LAS and the TFA sessions in Baidoa by 
the UNDP. The Khartoum process was financed by the LAS, while the Djibouti IV 
process was initiated by the UN and financed by the EU. The post-2004 TFG and the 
current unity government in Mogadishu have been dependent on AMISOM troops. Indeed, 
a major weakness of the transitional governments has been their inability to establish 
functional revenue collection institutions. This failure has made them pawns of 
international actors. Our recommendation then is that Somali transitional institutions must 
establish functioning revenue collection institutions in the areas they control.     
 
Fourthly, the conflict in Somalia has to be de-linked from international terrorism 
discourses. Analysts have consistently warned that though the case of the linkage is 
plausible, stateless Somalia is not an attractive location for international terrorists, 
including Al-Qaeda, as terrorists thrive in countries with weak dysfunctional states. In that 
sense, analysts have argued, Yemen is more attractive to Al-Qaeda than Somalia. We thus 
recommend adoption of peacemaking approaches that de-links the conflict from 
discourses on terrorism. Indeed, the „enhanced security for both the West and the people 
of the Horn of Africa‟ requires addressing the „overwhelming crisis of political and 
economic underdevelopment‟ (Menkhaus, 2002a: 122).   
 
Fifthly, Somali actors‟ have to appreciate the importance of conflict reframing. One 
weakness with all Somali factions is that they approach peace processes with rigid, 
uncompromising positions. Their positional negotiation style leads to bitter arguments, 
mutual hostilities and violence escalation. Reframing the conflict in terms of interests will 
refocus them to examine how all actors‟ interests could be satisfied. In turn, this will lead 
to transformation of all actors. Conflict reframing will also address other challenges such 
as inclusion-exclusion, third-party biases and the pervasive fear of the return of the state. 
The international actors should promote conflict reframing efforts.    
 
Sixthly, support for different state structures arise from different interests. By prioritising 
their own interests, the international actors hampered debates by Somali actors on the 
post-agreement system that would best satisfy the interests of all Somali groups. We 
therefore recommend that all international actors must let Somalis engage freely on the 
best state system that will satisfy the interests of all Somali groups. This includes candidly 
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addressing the question of Somaliland. These discussions must however be tempered by 
considerations of the regional dynamics. This means as Somalis choose their system they 
must recognise the interests of their neighbours. For example, rather than view Ethiopia as 
an enemy, Somalis could consider opening a trade corridor that links landlocked Ethiopia 
with ports in Somalia. Somalis would then benefit from Ethiopia‟s diversity, relatively 
advanced infrastructure and huge market, while Ethiopia would access the sea. Such 
mutually beneficial relations would also address the Ogaden problem. Indeed, Somalis can 
learn from Kenya-Ethiopia relations which have seen the two build a modern highway that 
links Nairobi with Addis Ababa.     
 
7.5   Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to summarise the main findings of the study, present lessons 
learned, locate Somalia‟s peace and conflict discourses within the broader peace studies 
theoretical approaches, and provide some policy recommendations. The chapter has 
summed up the key impacts of the competing international interests in Somalia‟s post-
2001 peace processes as undermining actor transformation, frustrating relationship 
transformation, hampering re-building of institutions and impeding transformation of 
conflict narratives and discourses. The key lessons that have emerged from these processes 
and impacts were classified into five themes: dynamics of peace negotiations, balance 
between conflict resolution and state-building, conflict intractability, approaches to post-
agreement state-building and links between Somali conflict and global discourses on 
terrorism. The chapter then advanced a peace studies perspective that linked the various 
interpretations, narratives and discourses which have been anchored on other theoretical 
approaches such as realism and structural-functionalism. Nonetheless, the study did not 
address issues of piracy because they did not feature in the post-2001 peace processes. The 
overall conclusion is that the prolonged Somali conflict is very complex, but it is not 
impossible to transform. The chapter has therefore ended with some policy 
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